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Critical Essay:
Musings on the Need to Convince Some People With
Disabilities That End-of-Life Decision-Making
Advocates Are Not Out to Get Them
Kathy L. Cerminara *
I felt a real connection to Kristen when I met her outside Woodside
Hospice ....
I liked Kristen.
Sure didn't want her to be afraid of me.
"I am not a cabbage, an onion, nor[sic] a cob of corn. I am a child
of God, sister of Jesus, with purpose just like Terri. Just like you," read
a sign in front of where Kristen lay.
Her sister, Tracey, said she wrote the message because Kristen's
hands are curled tight and she's practically immobile. But it's what
Kristen wanted to write down. Just as it was Kristen who told Tracey to
head to Woodside Hospice....
The [Theresa Marie] Schiavo case, as the sign showed, had Kristen
worried.
Which is a shame. Because Kristen has nothing to worry about. She
suffered residual brain damage as a result of viral encephalitis in
1976 .... She's alert. And although I can't make out her words,
Kristen's clearly communicating.
Wish I could make her understand that she has nothing to worry
about. That the people who fought legislative intrusion denying Schiavo
the right to die would fight just as hard to make sure some politician
didn't deny Kristen her right to live - if that was her choice. 1
* Professor, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center. Thanks to Todd Cole and
Russell Dombrow for exemplary research assistance, and to Elizabeth Pendo for thoughtful
comments. Errors remain mine.
1. Ralph de la Cruz, A Battle for the Right to Choose, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 29, 2005,
at 1E.
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I. INTRODUCTION
South Florida columnist Ralph de la Cruz wrote that passage shortly
after a visit to the protest scene outside the hospice in which Theresa
Marie Schiavo was a patient.2 At that time, Ms. Schiavo was two days
from death.3 Now that she has died, it seems an appropriate time to
reflect upon the situation de la Cruz described. As noted legal scholar
John Robertson has recognized,4 the importance of Schiavo is not legal.
In fact, the various Schiavo opinions broke no new legal ground other
than the constitutional questions raised after both legislatures and courts
attempted to direct the Schiavo family's end-of-life decision making.
5
Rather, it was activism by certain disability rights and vitalist groups
6
that caught the attention of the public, the politicians, and the media.
Kristen's fear is the type that helps such activism flourish. Although
she remained capable of interacting with others and making competent
decisions, Kristen nevertheless feared that someone would deny her
2. Id.
3. Abby Goodnough, Schiavo Dies, Ending Bitter Case Over Feeding Tube, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
1, 2005, at Al.
4. John Robertson, Schiavo and Its (In)significance, 35 STETSON L. REv. (forthcoming 2006)
(manuscript at 2, on file with the author) ("In the end the case of Theresa Schiavo will have
contributed little to end-of-life law .. "). Attorney and author William Colby made a similar
point in his keynote speech at this Symposium, when he noted that much of the controversy in
this area of law is not about the law.
5. Courts faced separation of powers issues when the Florida Legislature passed a law directed
at overturning court rulings authorizing removal of the tube providing Ms. Schiavo with artificial
nutrition and hydration. Bush v. Schiavo (Schiavo V), 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004), aff'g 871 So.
2d 1012 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1086 (2005). Similarly, courts encountered
jurisdictional and constitutional questions, although they ignored them in the short term, when the
United States Congress later passed a law granting Ms. Schiavo's parents the ability to file a
lawsuit in federal court to protest the removal of that same tube. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v.
Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1272-77 (11 th Cir. 2005) (Birch, J., specially concurring), stay denied,
125 S. Ct. 1722 (2005). All Schiavo opinions cited in this Essay, published and unpublished, may
be accessed at an Internet-based, interactive timeline. University of Miami Ethics Program,
http://www.miami.edu/ethics2/schiavo-project.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
6. The term "vitalist" here is used to describe those pro-life groups whose work Lois Shepard
has described in Schiavo as being "substantially about other causes that such groups wished to
advance, such as the protection of fetuses and embryos." Lois Shepherd, In Respect of People
Living in a Vegetative State-And Allowing Them to Die 50 (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law Pub.
Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 153), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=700245.
The terms "disability rights and vitalist groups," "disability rights and vitalist activists," and
"activists" are used here to denote the disability rights groups who have adopted vitalist positions
and chosen to work in concert with pro-life groups in cases such as Schiavo. Clearly, this does
not include all disability rights groups. See infra Part IV (discussing the strange pairing of the
disability rights movement and vitalist activists).
7. See, e.g., Arian Campo-Flores, The Legacy of Terri Schiavo, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 4, 2005, at
22, 24 (describing, in retrospect, the "unprecedented mobilization of powerful actors-including
the Florida governor and Legislature, the Congress, the president, the Vatican and scores of
activist groups").
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medical care if the law permitted the withdrawal of Ms. Schiavo's
medically supplied nutrition and hydration. 8 Focused upon the imagery
and framing utilized by vitalist activists, Kristen saw herself reflected in
Ms. Schiavo's position, despite the fact that Ms. Schiavo, unlike
Kristen, lay in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). 9  In this way,
Kristen's fears reflect those shared by many persons with disabilities:
despite their ability to communicate and make medical care decisions,
they fear either that they will be coerced into giving up on life because
others devalue their lives or that others who devalue their lives will
intervene to remove treatment and leave them to die without food or
water.10 As a result, Kristen's fear-and the fears of all those with
disabilities-must be addressed by those who believe in the right to
self-determination in end-of-life medical decision-making in order to
avoid retreat from the principles eloquently explained in the landmark
case of In re Quinlan.II
Since Quinlan, those who keep abreast of end-of-life decision-
making law have noted the increasing frequency with which disability
rights activists pair with vitalist activists to oppose certain end-of-life
choices. 12  In the 1980s, for example, protesters expressed concerns
about disability discrimination when Elizabeth Bouvia, a young woman
with cerebral palsy, petitioned the California courts for the right to
8. See infra Part ll.A.2 (discussing the use of medically supplied nutrition and hydration).
9. See infra Part H.A. 1 (discussing the differences between those in persistent vegetative states
and those who are minimally conscious).
10. See Stanley S. Herr, No Place to Go: Refiisal of Life-Sustaining Treatment by Competent
Persons With Physical Disabilities, 8 ISSUES L. & MED. 3 (1992) (examining the factors that
affect a person's decision to refuse life-sustaining care and treatment); Joseph P. Shapiro, No Less
Worthy A Life, in No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 260 (1993) (citing the story behind State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989), as a
"another chilling reminder of how a disabled life was dismissed... as a devalued life"); Harriet
McBryde Johnson, Not Dead at All: Why Congress was Right to Stick Up for Terri Schiavo,
SLATE, Mar. 23, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2115208/ (characterizing Ms. Schiavo's case as
being "not about end-of-life decision-making" but about "whether she should be killed by
starvation and dehydration").
11. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976). Quinlan was the first reported end-of-life decision-making case. ALAN MEISEL &
KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING § 1.04,
at 1-10 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter THE RIGHT TO DIE]. As such, it "set the pattern for succeeding
death and dying jurisprudence." Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A Review
of the Jurisprudence of Death and Dying, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 182, 183 (2001).
12. E.g., Issues Surrounding Terri Schindler-Schiavo Are Disability Rights Issues, Say
National Disability Organizations, www.ragged-edge-mag.conschiavostatement.html, Oct. 27,
2003 (noting that "[t]he 'right to life' movement has embraced [Ms. Schiavo's] cause to prove
,sanctity of life"' but that "the life-and-death issues surrounding Terri Schindler-Schiavo are first
and foremost disability rights issues").
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refuse medically supplied nutrition and hydration. 13  In the late 1980s
and early 1990s, disability rights activists and vitalist activists paired
not only to articulate legal arguments in the case of Nancy Beth Cruzan,
who lay in a PVS, but also to storm her hospital when her family finally
won the right to withdraw her medically supplied nutrition and
hydration in accordance with her wishes. 14 Most recently in 2005, the
nation saw the same story unfold in Florida even more dramatically in
the Schiavo case.1 5 Activists not only articulated legal arguments and
protested outside of Ms. Schiavo's hospice; they also joined in the
efforts of Ms. Schiavo's parents to pressure the President of the United
States, the Governor of Florida, and state and federal legislators to
overturn court rulings that permitted Ms. Schiavo's husband to
authorize the withdrawal of her medically supplied nutrition and
hydration.
16
Ralph de la Cruz's story about Kristen helps those of us who are not
disabled comprehend how activists heightened the fears of some
persons with disabilities through the Schiavo case. In that sense, de la
Cruz's column is reminiscent of the position of one disability rights
activist (a personal friend of this author) who generally supports
individual autonomy and the right to live one's life as one chooses.
This person, however, opposes many developments in end-of-life
decision-making law. Such a position seems inconsistent until one
hears the story behind her beliefs. Once, this activist had been a fervent
supporter of many important developments in end-of-life decision-
making, such as advance directives and "Do Not Resuscitate" (DNR)
13. See Judith Cummins, Judge Prepares to Rule on Death Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1983,
at A22 (noting, at time of trial, view of advocacy group as being that Ms. Bouvia's wish to refuse
her nasogastric tube feeding "poses a threat to all handicapped people by seeming to cheapen the
value of their lives"); Murray Dubin, Young Quadriplegic Hopes to Win One Last Battle: the
Right to Die, MIA. HERALD, Dec. 16, 1983, at IA (quoting a lawyer for a disability rights
advocacy group intervening in the case as saying, "[t]he message that Elizabeth Bouvia and other
disabled in this country must hear is that she shall live"). See generally Bouvia v. Superior Court,
225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the state's interest in preserving life did not
outweigh the patient's right to refuse treatment).
14. WILLIAM H. COLBY, THE LONG GOODBYE: THE DEATHS OF NANCY CRUZAN 369-72
(2002); see generally Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that a
state could require clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent's wishes to refuse treatment).
15. See generally Campo-Flores, supra note 7 (describing the various individuals involved in
the Schiavo case).
16. See Abby Goodnough, Protesters Hold Vigil for Schiavo at Hospice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
20, 2005, at A29 (reporting actions of protesters prior to the passage of the Act for the Relief of
the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005)); Comatose
Woman's Parents Ask Governor to Forestall Her Death, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 14, 2003,
at 1A (describing vigil and email pleas to the governor prior to eventual passage of 2003 Fla.
Laws 418 (held unconstitutional in Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004)).
[Vol. 37
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orders. Then, years ago, while representing mentally ill patients in a
facility, she discovered that every mentally ill patient in that facility had
a charted DNR order, often without the patient's family's knowledge.
Seeing that, she began to believe that the risks of abuse of people with
disabilities were too great to justify supporting the extension of the
principle of self-determination beyond those competent to assert their
wishes at the time of medical decision-making. 17
Those with legal training may respond on multiple levels to this story
and this activist's position. The particular facility described in that
story entered DNR orders on the charts of patients without appropriately
consulting surrogate decision-makers and apparently in the absence of
adequate reason. This alleged act raises serious concerns about
violations of patients' rights. 18 However, this alleged act alone does not
mean that the law is flawed; it may simply point to the necessity of
policing and punishing violations of the law. Further, that anecdote
could have been exaggerated or may not tell the entire story, so basing a
legal response upon that story may be unwise. 19 Finally, even assuming
complete accuracy and lack of exaggeration in that account, this single
story does not demonstrate that such events were widespread, and it
certainly does not negate the presence of some good-faith mistakes
about the meaning of the law at that time. In fact, according to the
person telling the story, the situation was corrected the minute it was
discovered, thus arguably demonstrating the presence of a good-faith
mistake.2
0
17. See also Johnson, supra note 10 (characterizing the Schiavo case as about starvation rather
than end-of-life decisions).
18. Informed consent may not always be legally required for entry of a DNR order on a
patient's chart. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 11, § 6.02, at 6-6. Entry of a DNR, however,
would not be appropriate except in cases of futile (or medically inappropriate) care, and, even
then "respect for patients and their families, not to mention ordinary prudence, strongly suggests
that physicians should at least inform patients or families that if a cardiopulmonary arrest occurs,
no efforts will be made to resuscitate because the treatment offers little benefit in comparison
with the burden it imposes." Id. at 6-17. On futility generally, see COUNCIL FOR ETHICAL AND
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS WITH
ANNOTATIONS, § 2.035, at 11 (2002) ("Physicians are not ethically obligated to deliver care that,
in their best professional judgment, will not have a reasonable chance of benefiting their
patients.").
19. Many scholars note in other contexts that basing policy decisions upon anecdote rather
than evidence may not lead to appropriate results. See, e.g., David Hyman, Do Good Stories
Make For Good Policy?, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1149 (2000) ("Stories may be effective
in mobilizing support for a policy, but it is quite a different question whether sound policies will
result.").
20. Certainly one can find individual instances of discrimination against persons with
disabilities in the medical setting just as in other setting. E.g., W. Richard Boyte, Pizza Ship:
Language Counts, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 240 (2004) (illustrating erroneous assumptions made by
physician about capability of ten-year-old patient with cerebral palsy). In allocating medical
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Persons with disabilities, however, may have different but similarly
strong reactions to my colleague's story that activists could use for
political ends. 2 1  Activists may easily capture the attention of some
people with disabilities by framing end-of-life dramas in the ways most
likely to incite fear.22 For this reason, more time must be spent eliciting
the full range of views on the subject from people with disabilities.
Surely there are as many people with disabilities who wish to secure for
themselves the right to make end-of-life decisions as those who are
galvanized by the fear stirred up by activist groups such as Not Dead
Yet.23 Policy makers must acknowledge the fears activists have incited
among people with disabilities, resist the urge to brush those concerns
off as unfounded, and assure full airing of the views of both those
people with disabilities who wish to exercise self-determination near the
24ends of their lives and those who are afraid. Doing so ultimately will
resources, however, physicians who adhere to the American Medical Association's Code of
Ethics are admonished that "[n]on-medical criteria, such as ability to pay, age, social worth,
perceived obstacles to treatment, patient contribution to illness or past use of resources should not
be considered." COUNCIL FOR ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 18, § 2.03, at 8.
With respect to DNR orders in particular, the AMA CEJA opines:
Efforts should be made to resuscitate patients who suffer cardiac or respiratory arrest
except when circumstances indicate that cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) would
be inappropriate or not in accord with the desired or best interests of the patient ...
Physicians should not permit their personal value judgments about quality of life to
obstruct the implementation of a patient's preferences regarding the use of CPR.
Id. § 2.22, at 93. See also id. § 2.17, at 60-61 ("In the making of decisions for... persons who
are severely disabled by injury or illness, the primary consideration should be what is best for the
individual patient and not the avoidance of a burden to the family or to society.").
21. E.g., Johnson, supra note 10 (arguing that the Schiavo case is not about end-of-life
decisions); The Elephant in the Living Room: End-of-Life Care Should Not Be About Ending the
Lives of People With Disabilities (unpublished literature distributed by disability rights
organization Not Dead Yet) (on file with the author) (advocating for the rights of people with
disabilities and against withdrawal of life support); see generally Not Dead Yet Homepage,
http://www.notdeadyet.org (visited Nov. 1, 2005) (expounding the beliefs of the organization,
Not Dead Yet); International Task Force on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide,
http://www.iaetf.org/ (visited Nov. 1, 2005) (explaining the beliefs of the organization and
providing news and recommendations).
22. The websites of certain activist organizations use terminology such as "non-voluntary
euthanasia based on the decisions of statutory guardians or health care providers" to describe
cases such as Schiavo's, see for example, Not Dead Yet,
http://www.notdeadyet.org/docs/drmwants0305.html (visited Nov. 1, 2005); or use the terms
"food and water" rather than "nutrition and hydration" to create imagery of starvation and
dehydration surrounding withdrawal, see International Task Force on Euthanasia and Assisted
Suicide, http://www.iaetf.org/ (at link to questions and answers about "artificial feeding") (visited
Nov. 1, 2005).
23. See infra Part II.A (discussing the different terminology used and explaining how that
terminology results in misperceptions); see also supra notes 21-22 (citing Not Dead Yet's
website).
24. See generally Carl E. Schneider, Hard Cases and the Politics of Righteousness, 35
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strengthen the right to self-determination of all citizens, as described so
well by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Quinlan.2 5
This Essay will examine how and why the concerns of some people
with disabilities so strongly emerged in Schiavo. First, it establishes a
framework for this examination by providing an overview of the
relevant end-of-life medical issues and key cases involved in these
controversies. 26 It then will examine why Schiavo struck such a chord
among activists and enabled them to inspire fear among others, drawing
the entire country into a highly publicized drama.2 Next, it will
explore Schiavo's pairing of a portion of the disability community with
vitalist forces and will place that pairing in historical perspective.
28
Following this, the Essay will demonstrate that the fears incited by
vitalist activists are in fact extreme and unfounded. Nevertheless,
because the power of imagery and framing is strong, this Essay will
conclude that a better attempt must be made to assure people with
disabilities, like Kristen, that advocates of the right to refuse treatment
are not "out to get them."
30
II. BACKGROUND
To best understand the concerns of persons with disabilities and the
ways in which those concerns emerged in the Schiavo case, it is
important first to understand the backdrop against which those fears
developed. This Part therefore provides a brief explanation of key
terminology and cases as they relate to end-of-life issues.
A. End-of-Life and Medical Care Terminology
Terminological precision is important in the end-of-life decision-
making setting, particularly with regard to certain medical conditions
and types of treatments. Patients in persistent vegetative states differ in
important ways from those who are minimally conscious, 31 yet the
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 24 (2005) (encouraging readers to hear the Schindlers' supporters with
"generosity").
25. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976). See also infra Part ll.B. 1 (discussing the Quinlan decision).
26. See infra Part II (examining key cases relating to end-of-life medical issues).
27. See infra Part ll (examining Schiavo's effect on activists).
28. See infra Part IV.A (exploring the pairing of a segment of the disability rights community
with the vitalist movement).
29. See infra Part IV.B (deconstructing the fears the vitalist activists have created).
30. See infra Part V (concluding that there is a need for reasoned discussions about the right of
autonomy of both disabled and non-disabled people alike).
31. See generally Editorial, Raising Consciousness, 115 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1102,
1102 (2005) (distinguishing between the two and describing Schiavo as "expos[ing) a critical gap
349
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terms are easily confused.32 Similarly, persons receiving medically
supplied artificial nutrition and hydration are not receiving "food and
water" in the sense that one envisions when hearing those words.33 The
distinctions are important.
1. Patients in Persistent Vegetative States As Contrasted With Those
Who Are Minimally Conscious
A patient in a PVS exists in a condition providing fertile ground for
activists' warnings of slippery slopes. 34  For the most part, these
patients do not appear to lack cognitive function, despite the long-
standing neurological position that they do. The term "persistent
vegetative state" has been around since 1972, when neurologists first
used it to label "patients who had, after trauma to the brain, entered a
continuing state of unconsciousness marked by periods of
wakefulness." 35 A person in a PVS actually can look as if he or she is
between emotional fervor about brain-injured patients and the medical science that informs the
standard of care for them").
32. Patients in either condition might be considered, and described as, "brain-damaged," for
example. Newspaper coverage of Ms. Schiavo's case often referred to her using that broader
descriptor, which does not accurately distinguish between a person in the uncommunicative,
unaware state of a PVS and a person with diminished mental capacity due to brain injury. See.,
e.g., Abby Goodnough, U.S. Judge Denies Feeding-Tube Bid in Schiavo's Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2005, at Al (using the broad term "brain damaged" to describe Ms. Schiavo's mental
state); Samantha Gross, Florida Effort to Keep Terri Schiavo Alive Hits Roadblock, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Mar. 17, 2005, at I (referring to Ms. Schiavo as "the severely brain-damaged
woman"); Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, Congress Passes and Bush Signs Legislation in
Schiavo Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005, at A] (explaining that Ms. Schiavo suffered brain
damage and was in a "'persistent vegetative state"'). Even court opinions can lead to similar
confusion. Karen Ann Quinlan was diagnosed as being in a PVS, but the court and at least one
physician witness, perhaps reflecting the level of medical knowledge at that time, also referred to
her as being "in a state of coma," or "comatose." In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 654, 671-72
(N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Comas and PVSs are
different conditions, although they are both forms of unconsciousness. Eelco F.M. Wijdicks &
Ronald E. Cranford, Clinical Diagnosis of Prolonged States of Impaired Consciousness in Adults,
80 MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS 1037, 1037 (2005); The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS,
Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State (First of Two Parts), 330 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1499, 1499 (1994) [hereinafter Multi-Society Task Force].
33. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing medically supplied nutrition and hydration).
34. A "slippery-slope" argument is an argument intended to say "that if we take the first step
there will be no stopping." BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 812
(2d ed. 1987). In Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), for example, Justice Souter,
saying "the case for the slippery slope is fairly made out here," expressed concern about eventual
approval of euthanasia if a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide were recognized. 521
U.S. at 784-85 (Souter, J., concurring).
35. Shepherd, supra note 6, at 8 (citing B. Jennett & F. Plum, Persistent Vegetative State After
Brain Damage: A Syndrome in Search of a Name, I LANCET 734 (1972)). Jennett and Plum's
definition still applies, although it has been expanded upon over the years. In 1994, the Multi-
Society Task Force on PVS said, "The vegetative state is a clinical condition of complete
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aware, even though the label describing him or her incorporates the
word "vegetative," thus giving rise to the popular, if offensive,
reference to persons in this condition existing as "vegetables." 36  In
reality, and as the public was made well-aware in Schiavo, a patient in a
PVS moans, appears to react, and has sleep-wake cycles. 37 Most end-
of-life decision-making cases in the United States have involved
patients in a PVS, 38 at least in part because those patients may appear to
be functioning although they are not.
In sharp contrast to a patient in a PVS, a person who is "minimally
conscious" has brain damage but "demonstrate [s] unequivocal, but
intermittent, behavioral evidence of awareness of self or...
environment." 39 Such patients exhibit "[e]vidence of limited but clearly
discernible self or environmental awareness on a reproducible or
sustained basis." 4°  The term "vegetative" does not apply to these
patients.41  Sadly, however, the misleading outward characteristics of
PVS patients can cause the general public and loving family members to
believe that those patients are instead minimally conscious.42  These
misconceptions are compounded when reports surface of patients who
unawareness of the self and the environment, accompanied by sleep-wake cycles with either
complete or partial preservation of hypothalamic and brain-stem autonomic functions." Multi-
Society Task Force, supra note 32, at 1499. "In general, though not without exception, the courts
use the term to describe a body which is functioning entirely in terms of its internal controls but
which exhibits no behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or awareness of the surroundings
in a learned manner." THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 11, § 6.04[I][1][a], at 6-125 (quoting In re
Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1987) (internal quotations omitted)).
36. Shepherd, supra note 6, at 9.
37. Kathy L. Cerminara, Tracking the Storm: The Far-Reaching Power of the Forces
Propelling the Schiavo Cases, 35 STETSON L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 3, 28-29,
on file with author); Shepherd, supra note 6, at 14. See also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990) (describing Ms. Cruzan's PVS condition); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 654
(describing Ms. Quinlan's sleep-wake cycles and noting that "[i]n the awake cycle she blinks,
cries out and does things of that sort but is still totally unaware of anyone or anything around
her").
38. THE RIGHTTO DIE, supra note 11, § 6.04[J][1], at 6-123.
39. N.D. Schiff, et al., MRI Reveals Large-Scale Network Activation in Minimally Conscious
Patients, 64 NEUROLOGY 514, 514 (2005).
40. Shepherd, supra note 6, at 15 n.36 (citing BRYAN JENNETT, THE VEGETATIVE STATE:
MEDICAL FACTS, ETHICAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS (2002)).
41. It is difficult to find accurate estimates of the numbers of patients in either PVS or
minimally conscious state, but about 15 years ago the American Medical Association estimated
that at least 100,00 patients existed in PVSs. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 11, § 6.04[I][1], at 6-
124. The New York Times stated in 2005 that "an estimated 100,000 to 300,000" persons are in a
minimally conscious state. Benedict Carey, New Signs of Awareness Seen in Some Brain-Injured
Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at Al.
42. See infra Part III.A (discussing the PVS condition in the context of the Schiavo case).
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emerge after many years from comas or other states of
unconsciousness.
43
In fact, however, the instances of such recovery are exceedingly
rare.44  After some period of time, the chances of recovery are
practically nonexistent, a fact that has led neurologists to advocate use
of the term "permanent vegetative state" rather than "persistent
vegetative state" when such a condition has existed for longer than the
period of time during which emergence back to consciousness is not at
all likely.
45
Both the condition of PVS and the way that people treat and view it
are complex. A person with a disability with some level of brain
damage, such as Kristen, might be led to the misconception that a
patient in a PVS is in fact minimally conscious.46  It would not be a
great leap thereafter to mistakenly believe that the law might not protect
persons with less brain damage, such as her.
2. Medically Supplied Nutrition and Hydration
Cases involving withholding or withdrawal of medically supplied
nutrition and hydration occupy a great deal of court and attorney time in
this country.4T  This hot-button issue has occupied the attention of
43. See, e.g., Miranda Hitti & Michael Smith, Progress For Man Who Spoke After 10-Year
Coma, May 4, 2005, http://mywebmd.com/content/article/105/107841.html (describing case of
firefighter regaining consciousness after 10 years); Nancy L. Childs & Walt N. Mercer, Late
Improvement in Consciousness After Post-Traumatic Vegetative State, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 24
(1996) (describing case of recovery after 15 months). See In re Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, at
6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Pinellas County, Feb. 11, 2000), available at University of Miami Ethics Program,
http://www.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/timeline.htm (follow February 11, 2000 "Trial Court
Ruling" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 1, 2005) (noting that evidence had been presented at trial of
a woman "who awakened from a coma.., after sixteen years").
44. Wijdicks & Cranford, supra, note 32, at 1044 (describing the media as being "replete with
so-called miracle awakenings, some of which are only temporary" and noting that the "press
coverage of these cases is hyperbolic"). See also THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 11, §
6.04[I][1][b], at 6-129 (examining the "clear and convincing" evidence standard in right-to-die
context).
45. Childs & Mercer, supra note 43, at 24-25. See also Wijdicks & Cranford, supra note 32,
at 1038 (terming the word "permanent" a "prognostic rather than diagnostic qualifier").
46. For example, in an article describing a study on minimally conscious patients, a professor
of neurology at Dartmouth College was described as saying that "findings from studies like these
would be relevant to cases like that of Terri Schiavo, a Florida woman with brain damage who
has been kept alive for years against her husband's wishes." Carey, supra note 41. Reading
further into the article reveals that this professor meant that the study's conclusions could help
neurologists in the future better determine the difference between patients in PVSs and those in
minimally conscious states, not that the study's findings about minimally conscious patients
applied to Ms. Schiavo, who was in a PVS. Id. A casual reader, stopping after this professor's
statement, however, could develop a very different impression.
47. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 11, § 6.03[G][5], at 6-79.
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religious leaders4 8 and has prompted use of terminology such as
"starvation" in describing the actions of those seeking to withdraw
treatment. 49  It is not a new concept, however, that medically supplied
artificial nutrition and hydration is considered medical treatment
capable of being refused like other medical treatments. The California
Appellate Court held to that effect when it permitted a competent,
twenty-eight year old woman with cerebral palsy to refuse
administration of artificial nutrition and hydration through a nasogastric
tube despite the absence of any physical medical condition that would
lead to imminent death. 50 The vast majority of American state courts
have similarly held,51 and the United States Supreme Court has ruled
that medically supplied nutrition and hydration constitutes medical
52treatment that can be refused. In Florida, the state statute governing
advance directives specifically provides that the term "life-prolongin
treatment" includes "artificially provided sustenance and hydration."'
Indeed, the provision of nutrition and hydration through a percutaneous
endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube involves the surgical insertion of a
tube into a patient's stomach to permit the injection of liquefied
nutrients directly into the stomach. The patient's medical condition
has rendered his or her body unable to ingest and process food and
water in the usual way.55  Before nasogastric and PEG tubes were
48. See generally Cerminara, supra note 37, at 23 (examining the Catholic Church's position
on the issue of withholding or withdrawing nutrition and hydration).
49. E.g., Not Dead Yet, Disability Activists Call for Moratorium on Starvation and
Dehydration, Feb. 14, 2005, http://www.notdeadyet.org/docs/moratoriumPR021405.htm (stating
"thousands of people around this country with labels of both MCS and PVS are being starved and
dehydrated"). Attorneys also use such inflammatory terminology. See Emergency Application
for Stay of Enforcement of the Judgment Below Pending the Filing and Disposition of a Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Second District,
Schindler ex rel. Schiavo v. Schiavo, No. 04A844, at 8 (U.S. Mar. 17, 2005) (on file with the
author) ("With less process than would be necessary to seize a refrigerator, a Florida court has
ordered the death of an innocent, disabled woman through one of the most cruel and unusual
means imaginable: starvation and dehydration.") (internal citations and quotation omitted).
50. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
51. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 11, § 6.03[G][4], at 6-74.
52. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(joining four dissenters to comprise a majority on this issue). See generally THE RIGHT TO DIE,
supra note 11, § 6.03[G][4][a], at 6-77 (discussing Justice O'Connor's concurrence, along with
four dissenting justices, constituting a majority on the issue of whether medical nutrition could be
refused).
53. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 765.101(10) (2005).
54. Cerminara, supra note 37, at 4 n.6.
55. See, e.g., Floyd Angus & Robert Burakoff, The Percutaneous Endoscopic Gastrostomy
Tube: Medical and Ethical Issues in Placement, 98 AM .J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 272, 274 (2003)
("The most common indication for PEG tube placement is neurological deficit causing
impairment in ability to obtain sufficient oral nutritional intake.").
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invented through advances in technology, that patient's condition would
have resulted in death.56 Refraining from using these highly technical
procedures to compensate for the body's malfunction is exactly
analogous to refraining from maintaining a patient on a ventilator when
his or her body is no longer able to breathe without assistance.
57
The same court that decided Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court,
is one of several courts recognizing that the same rationale underlies the
right to refuse both ventilator support and medically supplied artificial
nutrition and hydration. 58  Such technologically advanced methods of
life support differ greatly from bottle-feeding or spoon-feeding; "they
are medical procedures with inherent risks and possible side effects,
instituted by skilled healthcare providers to compensate for impaired
physical functioning." 59 Not quite a decade after Quinlan, the New
Jersey Supreme Court likened medically supplied artificial nutrition and
hydration to breathing through use of a respirator.60 As that same court
elaborated two years thereafter:
Just as a patient does not die because of the withdrawal of a kidney
dialysis machine, but because his underlying disease has destroyed the
proper functioning of his kidney, so [the patient] Hilda Peter will not
die from the withdrawal of the nasogastric tube, but because of her
underlying medical problem, i.e.,her inability to swallow. Withdrawal
of the nasogastric tube, like discontinuance of other kinds of artificial
treatment, merely acquiesces in the natural cessation of a bodily
function. The cessation is the cause of death, not the acquiescence.
61
Unfortunately, the objections of religious leaders and continued use
of terms such as "starvation" in connection with the withholding or
withdrawal of such treatment fuels the fears of some persons with
56. E.g., In re Tavel, 661 A.2d 1061, 1069 n.3 (Del. 1995) (stating that the physician testified
that the death of the patient in PVS would result from "natural causes" if medically supplied
artificial nutrition and hydration were removed).
57. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1235 (N.J. 1985); THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 11, §
6.03[G] [3], at 6-72-6-73.
58. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1235. See also McConnell v. Beverly Enters.-Conn., Inc., 553 A.2d
596, 608 (Conn. 1989) (Healy, J., concurring) (affirming the similarity between removal of a
respirator and gastrostomy tube); In re Tavel, 661 A.2d 1061, 1069 (Del. 1995) (holding that the
"substituted judgment" of the guardian best accomplishes the ward's goal); In re Estate of
Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1201 (I11. 1990) (holding that a public guardian has standing to
petition the court to discontinue artificial feeding and hydration of a ward); In re Grant, 747 P.2d
445 (Wash. 1987), modified, 757 P.2d 534 (Wash. 1988) (finding similarity between removing a
feeding tube and removing a respirator).
59. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1236.
60. Id.
61. In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 428 (N.J. 1985). This position accords with the positions of all
the major medical associations. Id. See also THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 11, § 6.03[G][4], at
6-75 to 6-76 (examining the consensus on the right to forgo medical treatment).
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disabilities. Pope John Paul II, of the Roman Catholic Church, entered
the fray in 2004 when he gave an address in which he seemingly
departed from the Roman Catholic tradition of determining on a case-
by-case basis, based on a burden-benefit analysis,6 2 whether to require
administration of medically supplied nutrition and hydration. 63  In that
address, the Pope first spoke of the importance of correctly diagnosing
patients' conditions. Then he stated that "the administration of water
and food, even when provided by artificial means, always represents a
natural means of preserving life, not a medical act" and "should be
considered, in principle, ordinary and proportionate, and as such
morally obligatory."6- In addition, religious leaders of other faiths,
although generally supporting the right to withhold or withdraw life-
65sustaining treatment when a patient nears life's end, sometimes
describe (and certainly in Schiavo described) withdrawal of medically
supplied nutrition and hydration as an immoral ending of life.
Activists are able to couple such moral criticism with use of
inflammatory terminology such as "starvation" to refer to the process of
withholding or withdrawing. 67  The result is that, even if they have
capacity to express their own wishes, persons such as Kristen, assisted
by the activists' rhetoric, may erroneously translate a willingness to
withhold medically supplied nutrition and hydration into a willingness
to rid the world of them by depriving them of food and water.
62. See Thomas A. Shannon & James J. Walter, Implications of the Papal Allocution on
Feeding Tubes, 34 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 18 (2004) ("Historically, the method for making a
determination about the use of a medical intervention was to consider the proportional benefits
and its harms to the individual, family, and community."); but see Mark Repenshek & John Paul
Slosar, Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration: A Contribution to the Dialogue, 34
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 13 (2004) (suggesting interpretation of the address in light of previous
papal teaching and Catholic theology rather than viewing it as a turnaround). See generally Death
and Dying, BIOLAW UPDATE (LexisNexis Academic & Library Solutions), 2004, at 72-78
(describing various Catholic teachings on end-of-life issues).
63. Pope John Paul II, On Life-Sustaining Treatments and the Vegetative State, 4 NAT'L
CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 573 (2004), available at
www.vatican.va/holy-father/j ohn-paul-ii/speeches/2004/march/documents/hf-jp-
ii.spe_20040420 congress-fiamc en.html.
64. Id. at 575 (emphasis omitted).
65. CAROL KROHN & SCOTT SUMMERS, ADVANCE HEALTH CARE DIRECTIVES: A
HANDBOOK FOR PROFESSIONALS 120-29 (2002).
66. See Megan O'Matz, Churches: Schiavo Must Live, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 21, 2005,
at 1B (naming a number of religious leaders of various churches constituting part of "a vocal and
influential circle of fundamentalists waging a fierce political battle to keep [Ms.] Schiavo alive").
67. E.g., Not Dead Yet, Moratorium, supra, note 49 (stating "thousands of people around this
country with labels of both MCS and PVS are being starved and dehydrated").
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B. Important Cases Leading Up to Schiavo
Three cases of national notoriety have sparked interest in end-of-life
decision-making: In re Quinlan;68  Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health;6 9 and the multiple opinions in Schiavo.70 A
review is instructive regarding the status of end-of-life issues in the
court system.
1. In re Quinlan
In Quinlan, the father of a 21-year-old woman in a PVS during the
early 1970's petitioned to be appointed guardian of his daughter so that
he could authorize the withdrawal of her ventilator support.71 The New
Jersey Supreme Court ruled that "[w]e have no doubt, in these unhappy
circumstances, that if Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an
interval (not altering the existing prognosis of the condition to which
she would soon return) and perceptive of her irreversible condition, she
could effectively decide upon the discontinuance of the life-sustaining
apparatus.' 72  Specifically, she could have exercised her constitutional
right to privacy by making such a choice. 73  Moreover, "[t]he only
practical way to prevent destruction of the right [was] to permit [her
father] to render [his] best judgment as to whether she would exercise it
in [the applicable] circumstances. '" 74
68. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
69. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
70. In re Schiavo (Schiavo 1), 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 789 So. 2d
348 (Fla. 2001); In re Schiavo (Schiavo I1), 792 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), review
denied, 855 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2003); In re Schiavo (Schiavo 111), 800 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001), review denied, 855 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2003); Advocacy Ctr. for Pers. With Disabilities,
Inc. v. Schiavo, 17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 291 (M.D. Fla. 2003); Bush v. Schiavo (Schiavo V),
885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004), affig 871 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 1086 (2005); Bush v. Schiavo, 861 So. 2d 506 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Bush v. Schiavo,
866 So. 2d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Bush v. Schiavo, 871 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004), aff d, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1086 (2005); In re Schiavo
(Schiavo IV), 851 So. 2d 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), aff'g, No. 90-2908-GB-003, 2002 WL
31817960 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2002), review denied, 855 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2003); Schindler v. Schiavo,
866 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223
(11th Cir.), affg 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla.), reh'g en banc denied, 403 F.3d 1261 (11th
Cir.) (en banc), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1692 (2005); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403
F.3d 1289 (11th Cir.), aff'g 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (M.D. Fla.), reh'g en banc denied, 404 F.3d
1270 (1lth Cir.) (en banc), reh'g denied, 404 F.3d 1282 (1lth Cir.), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1722
(2005); In re Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GB-003, 2005 WL 459634 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 28, 2005),
aff'd, 30 Fla. L. Weekly D743 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1622 (2005).
71. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 665.
72. Id. at 663.
73. Id. at 663-64.
74. Id. at 665.
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The court in Quinlan spent some time discussing what it termed "the
medical factor" in the case, referring as it did so to the "medical
decision supporting the determination below." 75 It distinguished the
withdrawal of life support from suicide by recognizing "a real
distinction between the self-infliction of deadly harm and a self-
determination against artificial life support or radical surgery, for
instance, in the face of irreversible, painful and certain imminent
,76death." It noted that the medical profession was, at that time in 1976,
debating definitions of death, and it acknowledged that "human
decisions against resuscitation or maintenance therapy are frequently a
recognized de facto response in the medical world to the irreversible,
terminal, painridden patient, especially with familial consent." 77 In an
oft-quoted passage, the court stated:
We glean from the record here that physicians distinguish between
curing the ill and comforting and easing the dying; that they refuse to
treat the curable as if they were dying or ought to die, and that they
have sometimes refused to treat the hopeless and dying as if they were
curable.... [M]any of them have refused to inflict an undesired
prolongation of the process of dying on a patient in irreversible
condition when it is clear that such 'therapy' offers neither human nor
humane benefit.
78
The court named Mr. Quinlan as his daughter's guardian and
authorized disconnection of her ventilator support if, upon further
review, her physicians and the hospital ethics committee concurred that
there was "no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging from [her
PVS] to a conitive, sapient state and that the [ventilator] should be
discontinued."9
2. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health
Fourteen years after the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in
Quinlan, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in the only
case it has considered directly involving the asserted right to have
medical treatment withheld or withdrawn.80  In Cruzan v. Director,
75. Id. at 664.
76. Id. at 665.
77. Id. at 667.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 671-72.
80. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). The Court has decided two
other end-of-life decision-making cases, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), and
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), but those cases considered whether a competent, terminally
ill patient has a constitutional right to receive assistance in ending his or her own life. As such,
while both they and Cruzan involved patients near the end of life and decisions that would result
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Missouri Department of Health, the parents of a young woman in a PVS
petitioned the Missouri courts for permission to authorize withdrawal of
their daughter's PEG tube, which was providing her with medically
supplied artificial nutrition and hydration. The Missouri state court
applied a clear and convincing evidentiary standard when deciding
whether to authorize the withdrawal and concentrated on whether
Nancy Beth Cruzan (the young woman) had indicated before the
automobile accident that left her in a PVS that she wanted artificial
nutrition and hydration withdrawn if she ever entered a PVS as a result
of an auto accident. 8 1 The argument before the United States Supreme
Court focused on whether the State of Missouri's application of a
demanding standard of proof, requiring not only clear and convincing
evidence but also that the evidence demonstrate Nancy's prior, actual,
expressed wishes, violated Nancy's Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interest in refusing treatment.8 2 The United States Supreme Court held
that the State of Missouri's imposition of such a high procedural,
evidentiary barrier did not violate the Constitution.
Cruzan involved a patient in a PVS, like Karen Ann Quinlan, but
differed from Quinlan because the patient's family wanted to withdraw
in the deaths of those patients, Glucksberg and Vacco differed from Cruzan in a number of
respects. First, Glucksberg and Vacco concerned competent patients' fights whereas Cruzan
addressed a situation involving an incompetent patient. Second, the patient-plaintiffs in
Glucksberg and Vacco were seeking a fight to assistance in suicide, a fight to end their own lives
by forces they set in motion other than the disease process; in Cruzan, withdrawal of the artificial
nutrition and hydration would permit the patient's condition to proceed to its inevitable
conclusion, without putting artificial barriers in the way of death. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 665
(noting the "real distinction between the self-infliction of deadly harm and a self-determination
against artificial life support...").
81. The Missouri court thus searched for clear and convincing evidence of Nancy's subjective,
actually expressed wishes. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 316 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The subjective test
is the most stringent test used in determining whether to permit the withholding or withdrawal of
treatment, for it requires actual previous patient statements demonstrating consideration of the
circumstances at hand to support withdrawal of treatment. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 11, §
4.05, at 4-28 to 4-29. Most states instead use a "substituted judgment" test, which examines what
the patient would have wanted had the patient considered the circumstances in question. See,
e.g., Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664-66 (applying the substituted judgment standard). The last
available test, the best interests test, generally will be applied under two circumstances: (1) when
the patient was never competent to make medical decisions (such as a child or a mentally retarded
person), or (2) when no evidence is available to demonstrate either the patient's actual or the
patient's inferred wishes. See, e.g., Woods v. Ky. Cabinet of Human Resources, 142 S.W.3d 24,
34-35 (Ky. 2004) (applying the best interests test in the case of a ward with a disability); In re
L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 67-68 n.8 (Wis. 1992) (citing statistics on individuals who had expressed
their wishes concerning life-sustaining treatment to their families).
82. The Court noted that many state courts had "held that a right to refuse treatment is
encompassed by a generalized constitutional fight of privacy." The Court stated, however, "We
believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interest." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 n.7.
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medically supplied artificial nutrition and hydration rather than
ventilator support. Although not explicitly stated in the Court's
majority opinion, a majority of the Justices in Cruzan concluded that
medically supplied artificial nutrition and hydration constitutes medical
treatment that can be refused the same as any other treatment.83 The
majority opinion implied as much and even named "lifesaving nutrition
and hydration" as the type of treatment it had in mind when assuming
the constitutionally protected right to refuse. 84  More specifically,
however, Justice O'Connor, writing in concurrence, made a point of
stating, "[a]rtificial feeding cannot readily be distinguished from other
forms of medical treatment." 85 Like other forms of medical treatment,
artificial feeding involves intrusion and restraint, neither of which
medical professionals can initiate without informed consent. She
concluded: "Accordingly, the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply
personal decision to reject medical treatment, including the artificial
delivery of food and water."
86
The four dissenting Justices-Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and
Stevens-agreed. Justice Brennan, writing for himself and Justices
Marshall and Blackmun, said bluntly that "[n]o material distinction can
be drawn between ... artificial nutrition and hydration... and any
other medical treatment." 87 Justice Stevens, writing a separate dissent,
did not expressly discuss whether artificial nutrition and hydration
constitute medical treatment, but he did refer several times to Nancy
Beth Cruzan's condition and her "medical treatment," while displaying
a familiarity with the record implying that he could not have overlooked
the fact that her "medical treatment" was artificial nutrition and
hydration. 88 Clearly, in his view, the result of the case before him wasan absolute bar to termination of something constituting "treatment."
3. The Schiavo Cases
In both Quinlan and Cruzan, family members were united. In
contrast, "[t]he death of Theresa Marie Schiavo came about only after
83. Id. at 279.
84. See id. at 278-79 (listing injection of medication and transfer to a mental hospital coupled
with mandatory behavior modification treatment as examples of treatment that may be refused).
85. Id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 289.
87. Id. at 307 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. When criticizing the majority's listing of cases it found precedential, for example, Justice
Stevens noted "none of the decisions surveyed by the Court interposed an absolute bar to the
termination of treatment for patient in a persistent vegetative state." Id. at 347 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
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almost seven years of argument among her family members."" Her
husband, Michael Schiavo, maintained, and succeeded in arguing to the
court, that she would have refused medically supplied nutrition and
hydration were she able to make decisions despite her PVS. Her
remaining family members were sure that her condition was not so
hopeless that she would have chosen to refuse treatment. "The result
was a bitter battle reaching through state and federal court systems,
legislatures and chief executives' offices."
90
The courts in Schiavo, although expressing empathy for Ms.
Schiavo's parents, brother and sister, who disagreed with Michael
Schiavo, 9 1 had no difficulty determining that Ms. Schiavo's PEG tube
should be withdrawn. Specifically, they ruled that clear and convincing
evidence had demonstrated that Ms. Schiavo was in a PVS92 and that
she would want withdrawal of medically supplied artificial nutrition and
hydration in her condition. 93 That decision became final and all appeals
had been exhausted in August 2003, when the Florida Supreme Court
denied review of the last ruling issued in the normal course of such a
case.94 Ms. Schiavo's PEG tube was subsequently removed in October
2003.95
89. Kathy L. Cerminara, Theresa Marie Schiavo's Long Road to Peace, 29 DEATH STUDIES
(forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 2, on file with the author). See generally Kathy Cerminara &
Kenneth Goodman, Key Events in the Case of Theresa Marie Schiavo,
http://www.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/timeline.htm (visited Nov. 1, 2005) (providing a detailed
timeline of the events of the Schiavo case).
90. Cerminara, supra note 89.
91. One appellate court, for example, said:
From our review of the videotapes of Ms. Schiavo, despite the irrefutable evidence that
her cerebral cortex has sustained the most severe of irreparable injuries, we understand
why a parent who had raised and nurtured a child from conception would hold out
hope that some level of cognitive function remained. If Mrs. Schiavo were our own
daughter, we could not but hold to such a faith.
But in the end, this case is not about the aspirations that loving parents have for their
children. It is about Theresa Schiavo's right to make her own decision, independent of
her parents and independent of her husband.
Schiavo IV, 851 So. 2d 182, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), affg, No. 90-2908-GB-003, 2002 WL
31817960 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2002), review denied, 855 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2003). See also Schiavo V,
885 So. 2d 321, 336 (Fla. 2004), aff'g 871 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied,
125 S, Ct. 1086 (2005) (determining the unconstitutionality of a law passed to reinsert Ms.
Schiavo's PEG tube, yet acknowledging "the grief so fully demonstrated by Theresa's family
members").
92. Schiavo V, 885 So. 2d at 325-29.
93. Id. at 325-29.
94. Schindler v. Schiavo, 855 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2003) (unpublished table decision); see Schiavo
V, 885 So. 2d at 331 (reciting the history of that case that resulted in the review being denied by
the Florida Supreme Court).
95. Schiavo V, 885 So. 2d at 331.
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At that point, prompted by emails, calls, letters and protests, the state
legislature and governor intervened. In October 2003, the Florida
Legislature passed, and the governor signed, a statute that would
become known as "Terri's Law." 96 This statute, which was later held to
be unconstitutional,97 gave Florida Governor Jeb Bush power to issue
an executive order requiring reinsertion of Ms. Schiavo's PEG tube, and
he so ordered.98 The PEG tube then remained in place, pending the
eventual ruling that Terri's Law was unconstitutional and decisions on
new motions filed by protesting family members, 99 until March 18,
2005, when it was again removed.100
Ms. Schiavo passed away on March 31, 2005, after the United States
Congress had also gotten involved, again in response to emails, calls,
letters and protests.1l 1 Congress passed, and President George W. Bush
signed, the Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie
Schiavo. 102 This act granted to the federal courts power to hear federal
claims Ms. Schiavo's parents asserted in protesting the withdrawal of
the PEG tube. 10 3 Efforts to reinsert the PEG tube failed, however, when
the federal courts refused to order it because Ms. Schiavo's parents
were unlikely to eventually win their federal lawsuit. 104
96. Terri's Law, 2003 FLA. LAWS 418. See generally Barbara A. Noah, Politicizing the End of
Life: Lessons From The Schiavo Controversy, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107 (2004) (discussing the
actions of politicians in the case of Terri Schiavo).
97. Schiavo V, 885 So. 2d at 328.
98. Terri's Law, 2003 FLA. LAWS 418; Fla. Exec. Order No. 03-201, available at
http://sun6.dms.state.fl.us/eog-new/eog/orders/2003/october/eo2OO3-201-10-22-03.htm]; Schiavo
V, 885 So. 2d at 328.
99. In re Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GB-003, 2005 WL 459634 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 28, 2005), affd,
30 Fla. L. Weekly D743 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1622 (2005).
100. Abby Goodnough & Carl Hulse, Despite Congress, Woman's Feeding Tube Is Removed,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2005, at Al.
101. Goodnough, supra note 3. See also Robin Toner & Carl Hulse, A Family's Battle Brings
Life's End into Discussion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at A19 (reporting on the number of
emails and calls to the U.S. Congress).
102. Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat.
15 (2005).
103. Id. See also Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1382 (M.D.
Ha.), aff'd, 403 F.3d 1223 (1 1th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 403 F.3d 1261 (1 1th Cir.) (en banc),
stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1692 (2005) (denying a motion for a temporary restraining order brought
under the Congressional act).
104. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1228-29 (11th Cir.), af'g 357 F.
Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla.), reh'g en banc denied, 403 F.3d 1261 (1 1th Cir.) (en banc), stay
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1692 (2005); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11 th
Cir.), aff'g 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (M.D. Fla.), reh'g en banc denied, 404 F.3d 1270 (11 th Cir.) (en
banc), reh 'g denied, 404 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1722 (2005).
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III. A COMBUSTIBLE COMBINATION: WHY SCHIAVO STRUCK SUCH A
CHORD
Schiavo differed in important ways from cases like Quinlan, and
those differences combined to heighten the possibility that some people
with disabilities would believe the "slippery-slope" arguments
articulated by vitalist activists. Unsurprisingly, the process of common-
law development outlined above 105  resulted in a progression of
differences among end-of-life decision-making cases. As the law
developed through Quinlan to Cruzan to Schiavo, increasing factual
differences were accompanied by increasing pandemonium among
activists. 10 6 Schiavo and Cruzan both resembled Quinlan in the sense
that each involved a young woman in a PVS, yet they both differed
from Quinlan because they addressed the withdrawal of medically
supplied nutrition and hydration rather than ventilator support. 10 7
Schiavo later took the differences two steps further. In stark contrast to
both Quinlan and Cruzan, it presented the courts and the public with a
story in which family members disagreed. 10 8  Moreover, due to the
passage of time and the increasing capability of telecommunications,
activists were able to spread messages much more quickly and visually
in Schiavo than in either Quinlan or Cruzan.109 All of these differences
105. See supra Part II.B (discussing the Quinlan and Cruzan cases).
106. To the extent that right-to-life protests accompanied the Quinlan ruling, if at all, evidence
of them is lost to time. In Cruzan, a small group of protesters picketed outside the facility in
which Nancy Cruzan was a patient and made plans to storm in and either "rescue" her or re-insert
a feeding tube into her nose and mouth. COLBY, supra note 14, at 368-69. In Schiavo, protesters
gathered around Ms. Schiavo's hospice by the hundreds, and thousands of others phoned, wrote
to, and emailed their Congressmen. See generally Goodnough, supra note 16 (reporting about
protesters at Schiavo's hospice); Toner & Hulse, supra note 101, at A19 (noting "tens of
thousands of calls and email messages in recent days"). See also Gary Schneeburger, Linked
Together for Impact, 2005, http://www.family.org/cforum/citizenmag/features/a0035297.cfm
(describing email pressure on state legislatures).
107. Compare In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (allowing the removal of ventilator
support), with Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (allowing the removal of
a nutrition and hydration tube), and Schiavo 1, 780 So. 2d 176 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 789 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2001) (allowing the removal of a nutrition and hydration tube). See
generally George J. Annas, "Culture of Life" Politics at the Bedside-The Case of Terri Schiavo,
352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1710 (2005) (discussing all three cases).
108. See Jay Wolfson, Erring on the Side of Theresa Schiavo: Reflections of the Special
Guardian Ad Litem, 35 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 16, 18-19 (2005) (describing points of family
disagreement).
109. See Ronald E. Cranford, Facts, Lies and Videotapes: The Permanent Vegetative State
and the Sad Case of Teri Schiavo, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 363, 370 (2005) (noting the
importance of videotaping, used both in the media by activists to visually portray Ms. Schiavo's
condition and at trial by those supporting withdrawal of treatment to show the depth of
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led to the increased likelihood that activists could-and in fact did-
galvanize some people with disabilities in Schiavo.
A. PVS as a Triggering Condition in Schiavo
The first appellate court to consider the Schiavo case noted that Ms.
Schiavo had "cycles of apparent wakefulness and apparent sleep" and
emitted "moaning sounds" when breathing.' 10 Two years later, the
same court noted, "[f]rom our review of the videotapes of [Ms.]
Schiavo, despite the irrefutable evidence that her cerebral cortex has
sustained the most severe of irreparable injuries, we understand why a
parent who had raised and nurtured a child from conception would hold
out hope that some level of cognitive function remained."111 In 2005,
that same court stated, "the images of [Ms.] Schiavo's face are
haunting. But the images do not reveal the full extent of the devastation
to her brain and her inability to engage in cognition." 1 12 In response to
last-ditch efforts in March 2005 to argue that Ms. Schiavo was not in a
PVS, the trial court judge wrote that, as had been true throughout the
court proceedings, consistent with the PVS diagnosis that had clearly
and convincingly been proven, "from time to time, [Ms. Schiavo]
responds to stimuli, . . . makes limited vocalizations, and ... can move
and change facial expressions."113
It is the willingness and desire to attribute cognitive awareness and
interactivity to a patient in a PVS based on such facts that cause cases
like Schiavo to be so difficult. In Schiavo, it was precisely this
misunderstanding that activists seized upon, perpetuated and magnified
until television stations across the land were playing videotapes of Ms.
Schiavo that misleadingly appeared to show a minimally conscious
person. 114  At the least, these activists succeeded in misleading some
federal legislators 115 and some persons with disabilities. 116
neurological examinations performed).
110. Schiavo 1, 780 So. 2d at 177.
111. Schiavo IV, 851 So. 2d 182, 196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), affg, No. 90-2908-GB-003,
2002 WL 31817960 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2002), review denied, 855 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2003).
112. In re Schiavo, No. 2D05-968, 30 Fla. L. Weekly D743 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
113. In re Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003, 2005 WL 459634, at *4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 28,
2005), aff'd, 30 Fla. L. Weekly D743 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1622 (2005).
114. Cerminara, supra note 37, at 11-12 (saying that activists were portraying Schiavo as
minimally conscious). While appearing to "show Terri consciously and emotionally interacting
with her parents," the videotapes and photographs of Ms. Schiavo, "to the trained eye of any
doctor experienced in the diagnosis of the vegetative state and related conditions,... demonstrate
rather conclusively that [she] was in a vegetative state." Cranford, supra note 109, at 366.
115. See Anita Kumar, David Karp & Chris Tisch, Congress Votes: Keep Schiavo Alive, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005, at 1A (quoting Rep. Jack Kingston (R-Ga.) as saying, based
on seeing videotape clips of Ms. Schiavo, "Here is what we know .... Terri is not in a persistent
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B. Medically Supplied Nutrition and Hydration in Schiavo
Additionally, as noted, both Cruzan and Schiavo differed from
Quinlan in that they required the courts to consider the propriety of
withdrawing medically supplied nutrition and hydration rather than
ventilator support, a treatment some more clearly see as "medical."
While the law has long seen no distinction, 1 1  some individuals,
including policymakers and activists, in both Quinlan and Cruzan
concentrated on inflaming the masses with judicious use of
terminology. "18
Demonstrations outside the patients' health care facilities provided
one prime opportunity to do so. In Cruzan, at least one protester
"walked around the first floor of [Nancy Cruzan's] hospital near the
administrative offices for nearly an hour, carrying a cup of water."
119
When questioned, he said he was trying to give a dying patient a cup of
water. 12  Signs at a tent city included pleas to "feed Nancy."' 12 1 In
Schiavo, protesters holding signs shaped like spoons that said, "Please
feed Terri" stood outside her hospice. 122  Protesters were arrested for
trying "to force their way past officers guarding the driveway of [the
hospice] to take bread and water to Ms. Schiavo as a symbolic
gesture."' 123 The Reverend Patrick Mahoney of the Christian Defense
Coalition, a protester himself, described the scene: "People want to
come with a cup of water and bread and say we're not leaving until my
sister Terri gets a chance to eat."
' 124
Another such opportunity arose during debate and demonstrations
about Ms. Schiavo's case in the capitals of both the United States and
Florida regarding Ms. Schiavo's treatment. Lobbying for a statute
requiring reinsertion of Ms. Schiavo's PEG tube in early 2005, Randall
vegetative state. Terri is able to laugh, able to cry and apparently able to hear.").
116. See de ]a Cruz, supra note 1 (describing Kristen, a woman with a disability who
protested outside Schiavo' s hospice).
117. See supra Part fl.A.2 (discussing the use of medically supplied nutrition and hydration).
118. Regarding the misleading effect of terminology on the public's perceptions of the case,
see Jean Heller, An Image to Make Stomachs Tighten, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 19, 2005, at
14A, and John Schwartz, Experts Say Ending Feeding Can Lead to a Gentle Death, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 2005, at A29.
119. COLBY, supra note 14, at 311.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 374.
122. Lesley Clark, Erika Bolstad & Martin Merzer, Feeding Tube Could Be Reconnected
Today, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 21, 2005, at A2.
123. Goodnough, supra note 16.
124. Lauren Bayne Anderson, Protesters Gather at Hospice, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar.
17, 2005, at 4B.
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Terry 125 said, "Terri does not deserve to be starved to death .... If we
had a dog and put it in a cage here at the Capitol and said we were going
to starve this dog to death, there'd be an outrage of public opinion-and
rightly so. Why do we treat a human being in ways we wouldn't treat a
dog?" 126 U.S. Senator Mel Martinez (R-Fla.) said, "[a]nytime a mom
wants to take a daughter home and love her and feed her, she ought to
be able to do that."' 27  House Majority Leader Tom DeLay described
Ms. Schiavo as "being dehydrated and starved to death," adding that
"[f]or 58 long hours, her mouth has been parched and her hunger pains
have been throbbing."'
128
Such language is effective. Anyone reading the references to
"starvation" or seeing the images of people trying to take food and
water into Ms. Cruzan's or Ms. Schiavo's room might wonder at the
scope of what was happening. Persons with disabilities certainly might,
and did. 129
C. Family Disagreement in Schiavo
Also as noted previously, Schiavo took us to a place neither Quinlan
nor Cruzan did by exposing family divisions and bitter disagreement
about the patient's wishes. Family disagreement is almost certain to
lead to litigation unless alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such
as ethics committees can avoid such an end. 131 If some loving family
125. See supra notes 168-69 (identifying Mr. Terry as the pro-life founder of Operation
Rescue and an outspoken critic of withdrawing Ms. Schiavo's PEG tube).
126. Bill Cotterell, Judge Orders Schiavo Hearing, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Feb. 23, 2005,
at Al.
127. Tamara Lytle & Sean Mussenden, Stalemates Block Schiavo Legislation, S. FLA. SUN-
SENTINEL, Mar. 18, 2005, at 17A.
128. Kumar et al., supra note 115. In reality, death after withdrawal of artificial nutrition and
hydration, even in patients that experience pain, does "not cause significant suffering. Physicians
and particularly nurses have written many observational pieces describing peaceful and
apparently comfortable deaths." James L. Bernat, Bernard Gert & R. Peter Mogielnicki, Patient
Refusal of Hydration and Nutrition: An Alternative to Physician-Assisted Suicide or Voluntary
Active Euthanasia, 153 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 2723, 2725-26 (1993) (proposing refusal of
nutrition and hydration by competent patients as an alternative to seeking to commit suicide or
asking someone to euthanize them). The process releases ketones in the body that can serve as
anesthetic. Id. at 2726. Moreover, patients in PVS have, at most, "inconsistent" responses to
pain stimuli. Wijdicks & Cranford, supra note 32, at 1038.
129. See de la Cruz, supra note I (describing Kristen's reaction to what she saw about Ms.
Schiavo's situation).
130. See Timothy E. Quill, Terri Schiavo-A Tragedy Compounded, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1630, 1631 (2005) (noting the breakdown of relationship between Ms. Schiavo's husband and
parents).
131. See generally THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 11, at § 3.24[B][1], at 3-93-3-94 (regarding
family disagreement); id. at § 3.25[A], at 3-96 (regarding ethics committees); Rebecca Dresser,
Schiavo: A Hard Case Makes Questionable Law, 34 HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 2004, at
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members believe a patient is minimally conscious rather than in a PVS,
then family disagreement is almost certain to be bitter and protracted. 132
For the general public, including some people with disabilities, the fact
that some family members believe that treatment should continue may
serve as a signal that family members objecting to treatment are acting
negatively toward the patient because of prejudices against persons in
states of diminished capacity.' 33 In reality, family members who seek
withholding or withdrawal of treatment can be, and often are, just as
loving and focused on the patient's wishes as are those who seek
continuation of treatment. 13  A family dispute over a desire to
withdraw treatment does not equate to bad faith on the part of one side
of that dispute, or to discrimination against people with disabilities.
The case of Hugh Finn provides an example of the way family
dynamics can give rise to vitalist concerns articulated as being rooted in
concern for people with disabilities. 135 Hugh Finn entered a PVS as a
result of an automobile accident.1 36 After about three and a half years
of his existence in that state, his wife decided in 1998 that Mr. Finn
would have chosen withdrawal of medically supplied nutrition and
hydration. 137 The Governor of Virginia intervened "to protect the
interests of the most vulnerable of the state's citizens," 138 and 400
people gathered to protest at Mr. Finn's nursing home, after objections
8, 9 ("Schiavo demonstrates the need for mediation and other dispute resolution procedures to
address family disagreements over life-sustaining treatment.").
132. See, e.g., In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987) (ruling that a patient was in a PVS).
133. Cf Lawrence 0. Gostin, Ethics, the Constitution, and the Dying Process: The Case of
Theresa Marie Schiavo, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2403, 2406 (2005) (discussing concerns of
persons with disabilities).
134. This presumes, of course, that those seeking continuation of the treatment are not acting
to serve their own needs by doing so, using the patient as an instrumentality. See Lois Shepherd,
Shattering the Neutral Surrogate Myth in End-of-Life Decisionmaking: Terri Schiavo and Her
Family, 35 CUM. L. REV. 575, 577 (2004) (acknowledging the possible existence of surrogates'
self interests when making end-of-life decisions); JAY WOLFSON, A REPORT TO Gov. JEB BUSH
IN THE MATTER OF THERESA MARIE SCHIAVO 14 (2003),
http://www.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/wolfson%27s%20report.pdf [hereinfter WOLFSON REPORT]
(noting that Ms. Schiavo's parents, who wanted continuation of treatment, appeared to be acting
in their own interests).
135. Gilmore v. Finn, 527 S.E.2d 426, 428 (Va. 2000).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. John J. Paris, Hugh Finn's 'Right to Die', AMERICA, Oct. 31, 1998, available at
http://www.americamagazine.org/articles/ParisFinn.htm. Specifically, Virginia agencies
conducted a series of investigative visits to the nursing home in which Mr. Finn was a patient,
apparently in response to requests from one of Mr. Finn's relatives and a member of the state
legislature. Finn, 527 S.E.2d at 430. The governor also filed a complaint against the nursing
home, Mr. Finn's doctor and Mr. Finn's wife seeking an injunction to prohibit them from
withdrawing Mr. Finn's artificial nutrition and hydration. Id.
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to withdrawal of treatment were raised by Mr. Finn's parents and
siblings. 139  In a preview of what would happen seven years later in
Schiavo,140 state social workers received anonymous calls that Mr. Finn
was suffering abuse and neglect, and the media and protesters
surrounded the nursing home until Mr. Finn died.14 1  Family members
who opposed Mrs. Finn's decision insisted "that Hugh was aware of his
environment and that he did not want to die."
142
It was family disagreement in the Finn case, just as it was family
disagreement in Schiavo, that prompted concerns. Outside observers
may question the motives prompting family members to take
diametrically opposite positions on a patient's wishes, especially
because the care of a patient in a PVS, like the care of some people with
disabilities, often imposes financial costs and other burdens on family
members. 143  People with disabilities observing disagreement among
family members may be concerned about the natural tendency we all
have to desire relief from costs and burdens. 144 Thus, they may become
concerned about the extent to which society honors the statements of
family members about incapacitated patients' wishes. 
145
Such views demonstrate a level of distrust that many who are not
disabled find difficult to comprehend. Persons without disabilities often
139. See Janet Heald Forlini, Hugh Finn Case is an Education for Advocates and the Public,
ABCD EXCHANGE, Nov. 1998, htpp://mywhatever.com/cifwriter/content/19/abcd1664.html
(describing the "400-person protest" prompted by Mr. Finn's parents and siblings).
140. See Graham Brink, DCF Found No Signs Terri Schiavo Abused, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2005, at 3B (describing 89 complaints between 2001 and 2004); Chris Tisch &
Curtis Krueger, Schiavo Abuse Claims Were Old, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 4, 2005, at IA
(recounting release of "nearly 70 pages" of documents memorializing state agency's abuse
investigations).
141. Forlini, supra note 139.
142. See Liz Townsend, Court Upholds Virginia Governor's Right to Intervene in Hugh Finn
Case, NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Apr. 2000, http://www.nrlc.org/news/2000/NRL04/finn.html.
143. One estimate of the costs of care provided to an elderly woman in a PVS receiving
medically supplied nutrition and hydration for several months in the late 1980s was about
$700,000. Steven H. Miles, Informed Demand for "Non-Beneficial" Medical Treatment, 325
NEW ENG. J. MED. 512, 512 (1991). In 1991, shortly after Cruzan was decided, one general
estimate of the cost of care of a patient in a PVS was "upwards of $130,000 per year." John D.
Arras, Beyond Cruzan: Individual Rights, Family Autonomy and the Persistent Vegetative State,
39 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 1018, 1018 (1991), reprinted in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
BIOETHICS (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 1994). For a thoughtful discussion of
such concerns with regard to providers (as opposed to surrogate decision-makers) who desire to
withdraw care from "costly" patients, see Philip G. Peters, When Physicians Balk at Futile Care:
Implications of the Disability Rights Laws, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 798, 857-62 (1997).
144. Gostin, supra note 133, at 2406.
145. Cf. Joan Didion, The Case of Theresa Schiavo, 52 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 9, 2005
(describing the social pressure to expressly choose to end one's life so as to not be a burden on
family members).
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are more ready than those with disabilities to put their faith in the
courts, for they perceive the courts as being on guard for such concerns
and ready to consider the parties' potential conflicts of interest when
making decisions. 14 6  Against the background of discrimination that
people with disabilities generally feel, those without disabilities should
not discount such fears should people like Kristen experience them.
147
D. Framing and Use of the Media in Schiavo
A final factor that differentiates Schiavo from Quinlan is the
increased awareness and use of the power of imagery through framing
and the media, including the Internet. All of the factors listed above
were magnified in Schiavo when framed or described in carefully
chosen terminology and when publicized through words, sounds and
pictures on instantaneous media outlets.
"Framing is the use of visuals, slogans, and context use of words,
images and context to manipulate or manage how people think about an
issue."' 148  A few examples from Schiavo illustrate just how well
disability rights and vitalist activists have learned to use framing.
Already discussed was the use of videotape clips to spread the
inaccurate message that Ms. Schiavo was minimally conscious rather
than in a PVS. 149  Television screens were filled with images of Ms.
Schiavo apparently fixating on a balloon or gazing at her mother.
150
Selected clips and images such as these can indeed manipulate a viewer
into believing that they truly depict the patient's condition. 
15 1
146. Cf Jennifer Fitzgerald, Bioethics, Disability and Death: Uncovering Cultural Bias in the
Euthanasia Debate, in DISABILITY, DIVERS-ABILITY AND LEGAL CHANGE 267, 277 (M. Jones &
L.A. Basser Marks eds., 1999) (arguing that the views of persons with disabilities should be
considered more explicitly, and noting that the legal system's "understanding of the vulnerability
of people with disabilit[ies] is... limited").
147. See Schneider, supra note 24, at 26-27 (arguing that society should "hear the Schindlers'
supporters in [a] generous spirit").
148. Robin Fiore et al., The Tragic and Strange Case of Terri Schiavo: How the "Framing" of
This Case Has Misled the Public and Almost Destroyed Thirty Years of Progress in End-of-Life
Policy 3 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). This manuscript, possibly to appear
soon as a book chapter, contains several examples of framing and media usage.
149. See supra Part Il.A (describing how playing videotapes of Ms. Schiavo led to
misunderstandings of her condition).
150. See Cranford, supra note 109, at 366 (discussing the brief videotapes of Ms. Schiavo
appearing to interact with family and friends). See generally Eric J. Cassell, The Schiavo Case: A
Medical Perspective, 35 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 22, 22 (2005) (discussing concerns about
privacy, noting "[t]he shocking, clamoring, and very public intrusion into the life and death of
Terri Schiavo").
151. Cranford, supra note 109, at 366 (describing a "strategy of misinformation").
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Two other examples also relate to the previously discussed
differences between Schiavo and Quinlan. Rather than explaining what
a PEG tube is and how it works, and acknowledging that it had been
fifteen years since Ms. Schiavo could eat as most people eat, activists
discussed attempts to "starve" Ms. Schiavo and to deprive her of "food
and water."152  Similarly, the case was presented not as a disagreement
between loving, well-meaning family members, but as an example of
one family member (Ms. Schiavo's husband) seeking to benefit
financially and to free himself from the burden of caring for a wife lying
in a hospice bed in favor of continuing his life with another woman and
the two children he had fathered with that other woman.
153
Compounding the effects of such word choice and story construction
was intelligent use of the media. Twenty-four-hour news broadcasts,
unavailable at the time of Quinlan and in their infancy at the time of
Cruzan, increased the opportunity for the previously mentioned
videotape clips to reach the public.15-4 Pictures of Ms. Schiavo appeared
throughout the country, including on Internet sites devoted to "saving"
her.15  Whereas organizers had to rely on fax communications and
152. See supra Part III.B (describing activists' demonstrations and media references to
"starvation").
153. Both money and Mr. Schiavo's relationship with another woman were sources of
antagonism. First, Ms. Schiavo's parents accused her husband of denying his wife treatment
because he wanted to inherit the money won in a malpractice case over the cause of the cardiac
arrest that resulted in her PVS. Melanie Ave & David Karp, After Jury Award, Battle Lines
Drawn, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 23, 2005, at IA (noting that Mr. Schiavo in turn accused
them of greed in wanting a share of the money). The trial court also mentioned that Ms.
Schiavo's parents had argued that Michael should be disqualified as his wife's guardian because
he stood to benefit by inheritance upon her death. See In re Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, at 2
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Pinellas County, Feb. 11, 2000), available at
http://www.miani.edu/ethics/schiavo/timeline.htm (follow February 11, 2000 "Trial Court
Ruling" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 1, 2005) ("Regrettably, money overshadows this entire case
and creates potential of conflict of interest for both sides.").
Second, by the time Ms. Schiavo's death drew near, protesters picketed the home Michael shared
with the mother of his children with signs saying, "Michael don't plan the wedding yet, [sic] we
still have hope!" and "Arrest Mike for Bigamy." Jamie Thompson, She's the Other Woman in
Michael Schiavo's Heart, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 26, 2005, at IA (describing the mother
of Michael Schiavo's two children as having been "anathematized, her name invoked as a key
reason why Schiavo ... should not control his wife's fate"). See also Chris Tisch, A Fate
Unclear, A Legacy Assured, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, at IA (describing Michael
Schiavo as having "at times been cast as a money-hungry villain only after the money his wife
received in a settlement and who has a new life with a girlfriend").
154. See Cranford, supra note 109, at 363 (describing "a war waged in the media and over the
internet"); see also Brad Smith, Schiavo Videotapes Offer Powerful But Misleading Evidence,
TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 20, 2005, at 12 (describing the powerful influence that the video clips of Terri
Schiavo had on the public).
155. E.g., The Terri Schindler-Schiavo Foundation, www.terrisfight.org (last visited Nov. 1,
2005).
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word of mouth at the time of Cruzan, they could use email at the time of
Schiavo, thus allowing for much larger demonstrations. 156 Email even
provided an efficient means of pressuring legislators; the Florida
Legislature received emails by the thousands in 2003, when the Schiavo
case initially reached the final judgment stage. 157
Bombarded with the effects of such framing and media usage, it is
easy for members of the general public, let alone some people with
disabilities, to believe that the facts are quite different from those
revealed in an actual courtroom. 158 Increased appreciation of the ability
to manipulate using words and images coupled with the remarkable ease
of publicity over the Internet makes it extremely easy to incite fear,
agitation, and anger. 159  Those who believe that the end result of
Schiavo was absolutely correct may find it difficult to, but should
nonetheless, empathize with those with disabilities who were hearing
these messages. Kristen and others like her saw many powerful images
and heard many touching descriptions designed to foster a misplaced
feeling of comradeship with Ms. Schiavo. 
160
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH PAIRING THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT
AND VITALIST ACTIVISTS
At the time the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Quinlan in 1976,
the disability rights movement was in its infancy. 161 By the time of the
events leading to Cruzan in 1990, the rights of people with disabilities
had nearly garnered comprehensive recognition through major federal
legislation, the Americans with Disabilities Act. 16 2 Schiavo brought to
156. Maya Bell, Sophisticated Tactics Aid Schiavo's Parents, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 13,
2005, at Al.
157. See Schneeburger, supra note 106 (stating that "legislators received more than 100,000
emails... that day from concerned citizens from coast to coast"). See also Toner & Hulse, supra
note 101 (describing email pressure on federal legislators).
158. Wisconsin Republican Representative James Sensenbrenner, Jr., provides an example.
The St. Petersburg Times quoted him as saying, "What's going on in Florida regarding Terri
Schiavo is nothing short of inhumane .... What Terri Schiavo and all disabled people deserve, in
contested cases, is for justice to tilt toward life." Alisa Ulferts, Anita Kumar & William R.
Levesque, U.S. House Acts to Save Schiavo, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at IA. The
law in fact already affords such a presumption toward preservation of life. See supra Part II.B.2
(describing the high standard of proof in withdrawal of treatment cases).
159. See supra notes 101, 106, 109, 114, 157 and accompanying text (describing the use of
pictures, videos, and emails in the Schiavo case).
160. Cf Cranford, supra note 109 (discussing the use of videotaped images in Terri Schaivo's
case).
161. See Richard K. Scotch, Politics and Policy in the History of the Disability Rights
Movement, 67 MILBANK Q. (supp. 2, pt. 2) 380, 387 (1989) (dating the beginning of a "broadly
based cross-disability movement advocating rights for disabled people" to the late 1960s).
162. The Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213, was passed in 1990.
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a head a phenomenon that had been foreshadowed since shortly after
Quinlan: the pairing of the disability rights and the vitalist activist
movements. 163 Unfortunately, individual persons with disabilities who
have joined the pairing of disability rights and vitalist activists that we
saw in Schiavo are in fact not being served by that pairing. They are
being used by it, in an effort by the vitalist community to bolster other
political agendas.
A. The Unfortunate Pairing
An early, if not the earliest, organized pairing of the disability rights
community and vitalist activists was an organization called Not Dead
Yet. 164  Self-described as a group opposed to legalization of assisted
suicide and euthanasia, it was formed in response to the 1996 acquittal
of Dr. Jack Kevorkian when he assisted two women in ending their lives
in Michigan. 165 Its founder, Diane Coleman, argues that many forms of
what she terms legalized "assisted suicide and euthanasia"-including
instances of withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment at
the express request of patients such as Elizabeth Bouvia--do not
present issues of "individual autonomy and rights" but instead present
issues of "disability discrimination, a profit-oriented health care system,
and a legal system that does not guarantee the equal protection of the
law."
166
Not Dead Yet was among the disability rights and vitalist activist
groups who joined in various aspects of the Schiavo case. 16 7 That the
The ADA prohibits discrimination "on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of
the ... services ... of any place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12,182 (2000). Its
importance in this context, however, is not its prohibition of discrimination against persons with
disabilities, see infra Part IV.B.2, but the symbolism of its passage as a sign of increased political
power on the part of persons with disabilities. See Scotch, supra note 161, at 398 (noting, before
passage of the ADA that "[t]he most significant legislative goal for the disability rights movement
and a test of its ability to enter coalitions has become enactment of' the ADA).
163. See supra Part I (discussing the pairing from Bouvia in the 1980s through Cruzan and
Schiavo).
164. See supra notes 21-22 (citing to the Not Dead Yet homepage and related websites and
describing the organization's purpose and goals).
165. Id.
166. Diane Coleman, Assisted Suicide and Disability: Another Perspective, 27 HUMAN
RIGHTS 6, 7 (winter 2000). See also Press Release, Issues Surrounding Terri Schindler-Schiavo
Are Disability Rights Issues, Say National Disability Organizations, Oct. 27, 2003,
http://www.ragged-edge-mag.com/schiavostatement.htnl (stating the position that Schiavo
presents disability rights issues).
167. See Schiavo IV, 851 So. 2d 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), affg, No. 90-2908-GB-003,
2002 WL 31817960 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2002), review denied, 855 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2003) (listing as
amici curiae Not Dead Yet and 18 other groups, including the American Catholic Lawyers
Association).
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activists are not motivated solely by concern for the rights of people
with disabilities is evident when one considers the presence and intense
involvement of Randall Terry in the Schiavo cases. 168  Mr. Terry,
described on a pro-life website as a "powerful and eloquent pro[-]life
spokesman,"' 169 is not an officer of Not Dead Yet; rather, he founded the
now-defunct pro-life organization Operation Rescue, which made
headlines in the 1990s by protesting at facilities providing abortions.
He now heads the Society for Truth and Justice, a similar group.
170
During the political struggles of the final days of Ms. Schiavo's life, Mr.
Terry lobbied for federal or state legislative or state gubernatorial action
that would result in reinsertion of the PEG tube. 17 1 After Ms. Schiavo
died, he urged his followers to "ensure that Terri's struggle was not in
vain." 172
It is important to note that not all people with disabilities buy into this
pairing. Only some disability rights groups, like some individual
persons with disabilities, have adopted vitalist positions and chosen to
work in concert with pro-life groups. 173  Adrienne Asch, a noted
authority on reproductive and other socio-ethical issues, has noted that
"[t]he disability perspective on treatment of disabled newborns,
physician-assisted suicide, and prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion
shares nothing with the right-to-life analysis, with which it is often
linked in bioethics discussion."1 74 Noting the pairing of disability rights
and vitalist activists at the time that the United States Supreme Court
168. Mr. Terry was also involved in protests at the time of Cruzan. COLBY, supra note 14, at
376.
169. Welcome to RandallTerry.com, http://www.randallterry.cornhome/index.cfm (last
visited Nov. 1, 2005).
170. History of Operation Rescue West, http://www.operationrescue.org/?p=64 (last visited
Nov. 1, 2005); The Society for Truth and Justice Home Page,
http://www.societyfortruthandjustice.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
171. See Goodnough, supra note 16 (describing Mr. Terry as saying that he would continue
lobbying both the United States Congress and the state legislature for legal action); Tamara Lytle
& Maya Bell, Schiavo Decision Sent Back to Court; Congress Rushes Through Legislation to
Keep Her Alive, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 21, 2005, at IA (describing Mr. Terry's travel to
the Florida state capital "to begin escalating the pressure on legislators and Gov. Jeb Bush"); see
also Erika Bolstad, Phil Long & Cara Buckley, Schiavo Receives Sacred Rites, MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 28, 2005, at IA (quoting Mr. Terry as saying of Ms. Schiavo, "she's responsive[;] she is still
communicating and this girl is fighting for her life").
172. The Death of Terri Schindler Must Not be in Vain, May 19, 2005,
http://www.societyfortruthandjustice.comlterri followup.htm.
173. See Andrew I. Batavia, Disability and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 336 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1671, 1671 (1997) (noting that the disability rights community's position on physician-
assisted suicide is not unanimous).
174. Adrienne Asch, Disability: Attitudes and Psychological Perspective, in 2 ENCYC.
BIOETHIcS 602, 606 (1995).
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was considering the constitutionality of laws prohibiting physician-
assisted suicide, Andrew Batavia, a quadriplegic attorney and professor
of some note, decried statements that Not Dead Yet was "just a
mouthpiece of the right-to-life movement and religious conservatives
generally." 175 Offering his "general impression" that members of Not
Dead Yet were "primarily on the other end of the political spectrum -
liberals and radicals," he termed the disability rights-vitalist pairing "a
case of some very strange political bedfellows."
176
Yet it is clear that the pairing was strong in Schiavo. The listing of
amicus briefs on the legal opinions reveals both disability rights and
vitalist activist groups. 177  Attorneys for Ms. Schiavo's parents were
paid by groups as diverse as the anti-abortion Life Legal Defense
Foundation; the anti-gay-rights Alliance Defense Fund; and the
Discovery Institute, which advocates the "teaching of creationist
'intelligent design' theory in public schools." 178 Some politicians citing
a "culture of death" joined in the effort to overrule judicial decisions in
Schiavo not out of concern for people with disabilities but based upon
vitalist convictions. 
179
B. Why the Pairing Is Unfortunate
Strange or not, a pairing between disability rights and vitalist activists
would not necessarily be unfortunate if each party in the pairing were
equally and fully committed to assisting the other party, without making
misrepresentations or preying on ill-founded fears to achieve support. It
also would not be unfortunate if the result were equally beneficial to
both sides. In this setting, however, the disability rights activists who
pair with vitalist activists, as well as people with disabilities like Kristen
who buy into the pairing, will be negatively affected in the long term if
175. Andrew I. Batavia, Disability and Physician-Assisted Dying, in PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
DYING: THE CASE FOR PALLIATIVE CARE AND PATIENT CHOICE 57 (Timothy E. Quill &
Margaret P. Battin eds., 2004). Mr. Batavia founded a group called AUTONOMY, Inc. to
counter the efforts of groups such as Not Dead Yet at that time. Id. at 58-59.
176. Id. at 57. See also Scotch, supra note 161, at 396 (describing first pairing of these "two
movements with substantially divergent ideologies"); Fiore et al., supra note 148, at 7 (describing
Schiavo as involving "a disability community that has rarely enjoyed the help or support of social
conservatives [that] has been convinced by those conservatives that it has an interest in the
outcome of Ms. Schiavo's case").
177. See, e.g., supra note 167 (noting the involvement of Not Dead Yet and the American
Catholic Lawyers Association, among others).
178. Jon B. Eisenberg, The Terri Schiavo Case: Following the Money, THE RECORDER, Mar.
4, 2005, at 4.
179. E.g., Steve Bousquet, A Crusade Against a 'Culture of Death': For Dennis Baxley,
Terri's Schiavo's Case is a Personal Fight, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at LB
(describing Republican House member Dennis Baxley's involvement in the Schiavo case).
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the advances in the law since Quinlan are permitted to be turned
back. 180  Most sadly, they will suffer that ill effect because of
misrepresentations and half-truths. 1
81
Kristen revealed fears stemming from two major misconceptions
regarding the Schiavo case. Going forward, perhaps reasoned
discussion, removed from the fervor of activism, could enable people
with disabilities such as Kristen to appreciate the position of those who
supported the outcome in Schiavo.18 2 In addition, perhaps those people
with disabilities who agreed with the Schiavo decisions, for certainly
there are some, will vocalize their positions as loudly as the disability
rights-vitalist activists have. Without such discussion and vocalization,
some people with disabilities, like Kristen, will buy into the activists'
pairing based on an incorrect perception that the law does not protect
them. Should this occur, the unfortunate result would be that people
with disabilities, along with the rest of society, would lose some of the
most important gains of Quinlan and its progeny.
1. Two Misconceptions
Kristen's sign illustrated one of the most important underpinnings of
the spread of fear among people with disabilities in Schiavo. Kristen
made a point in her sign of saying that she was "not a cabbage, an
onion, nor [sic] a cob of corn." 18 3  That young woman (who, though
suffering brain damage, was perfectly alert) was worried about being
considered a vegetable. 184 The very term "persistent vegetative state,"
describing the condition in which Karen Ann Quinlan, Nancy Beth
Cruzan and Terri Schiavo existed before they died, can cause other
persons with brain-related disabilities to think that they are being
diminished. 85 Yet Schiavo involved not a person with a disability, but
180. See infra Part IV.B.2. (describing some ways laws proposed as a result of the pairing will
impair autonomy for persons with disabilities).
181. E.g., Cranford, supra note 109, at 367, 369 (describing the "unbelievably false and
misleading medical testimony" and describing the use of videotape clips in Schiavo as part of a
"strategy of misinformation").
182. Schneider, supra note 24, at 27.
183. de la Cruz, supra note 1.
184. Id.
185. Use of the term "vegetative" inspires thoughts of vegetables, as illustrated by Kristen's
reference to cabbages, onions, and corn. Referring to a human being as a vegetable reveals "a
stigma that depicts (persons with disabilities] as 'not quite human."' Harlan Hahn, The Politics of
Physical Differences: Disability and Discrimination, 44 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 39, 41 (1988) (quoting
E. GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NoTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963) (describing
generally the stigma facing "[p]ersons who fail to meet prescribed standards of physical
attractiveness and functional independence")).
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a "not abled" person, 186 indicating the presence of a clear dividing line
between a person in a PVS and another person with brain damage or a
physical disability. The task for supporters of the Schiavo rulings is to
explain how a person in a PVS differs from a person with a disability.
The person in a PVS has absolutely no awareness, even if appearances
suggest otherwise. 187  He or she is in a totally different state from
Kristen and the other people with disabilities who joined in the protests
outside of Ms. Schiavo's hospice room.
Moreover, even if a person is "disabled" rather than "not abled,"
there are at least two reasons unrelated to disability discrimination why
that person, and that person's surrogate decision-makers, might wish to
refuse the administration of medically supplied nutrition and hydration.
First, the administration of such treatment can in some instances be
physically harmful to the patient. 18 8  Second, even when it is not
harmful in the sense of being painful or causing medical problems, it
does constitute a bodily intrusion, and the ability to avoid such
intrusions when not desired is at the heart of a person's right to bodily
integrity. 1
89
The case of Sheila Pouliot in New York illustrates the point that the
medical administration of nutrition and hydration actually may do more
harm than good. 190  In 1999, at the age of 42, Sheila Pouliot was
admitted to University Hospital at the State University of New York in
Syracuse. 19 1 She was partially blind and profoundly mentally retarded;
she could not speak, walk, or read; and she received nutrition and
hydration through a gastrostomy tube (G tube) because she could not
eat.192 She was suffering from bleeding in her gastrointestinal tract and
186. Credit is due to Ken Goodman, Director of the University of Miami Ethics Programs, for
conceiving this dichotomy and the use of the term "not abled" to describe a person in a PVS.
187. See Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, supra note 32, at 1499 (describing a lack of
awareness in PVS patients); Cranford, supra note 109, at 369 ("[T]he patient in the vegetative
state... is unconscious and thus incapable of any suffering."). See also Shepherd, supra note 6,
at 23 (describing PVS and its manifestations).
188. See infra text accompanying notes 190-97 (describing a case in which artificial nutrition
and hydration caused greater pain than benefit to the patient). See, e.g., David Orentlicher &
Christopher M. Callahan, Feeding Tubes, Slippery Slopes, and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 25 J.
LEGAL MED. 389, 391-97 (2004) (summarizing studies "generally suggest[ing] that patients,
families, and physicians misjudge the benefits derived from tube feeding"); Angus & Burakoff,
supra note 55, at 273 (discussing the geriatric population and noting the burdens that artificial
nutrition and hydration sometimes create without resulting in a significant benefit).
189. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 288-90 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
190. Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F. Supp. 2d 184, 186 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
191. Id.
192. Id.
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what appeared to be aspirational pneumonia. 193  Because of her
gastrointestinal condition, the administration of nutrition through the G
tube caused her pain, which she communicated by groaning. 194  Her
family requested withholding of all nutrition, hydration and antibiotics,
and a judge approved the termination of all medical treatment "except
for nutrition, as tolerated, and palliative hydration care. 195
Unfortunately, her body could tolerate no protein in the small amount of
fluids she was able to take; of her approximately 300 calories a day,
most consisted of sugar water. 196 The result was actually detrimental:
The long-term provision of calories in the absence of protein causes
more problems than it solves. The nutrition contained in the fluids -
consisting only of glucose - is sufficient to maintain life (heart and
lung function). But it cannot prevent protein starvation. In fact, there
is universal medical agreement that the prolonged provision of
calories in the absence of the ability to provide protein is inappropriate
medical care....
During that time, Ms. Pouliot's body began to catabolize her own
tissue. The hydration provided through the IV tubes damaged her
organs and caused her severe pain. Further, it caused her severe
edema, which stretched her skin to the point where it fell off and left
raw painful areas. She was in agony. She spent the next two months
moaning and curled in the fetal position.
Despite aggressive efforts to control her symptoms, such control was
not achieved, and the principle of safe and comfortable dying was
violated. 197
Ms. Pouliot's life was prolonged in this condition because New
York's law at that time had been interpreted to bar the withholding or
withdrawal of any life-sustaining treatment from a patient who had
never had capacity to make her own decisions and thus had never had
193. Blouin v. Spitzer, 01-CV-0925 HGM/GJD, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18243, at *1
(N.D.N.Y. 2001). On the issue of whether she actually suffered from pneumonia, see Alicia R.
Ouellette, When Vitalism is Dead Wrong: The Discrimination Against and Torture of
Incompetent Patients by Compulsory Life-Sustaining Treatment, 79 IND. L.J. 1, 14 n.67 (2004).
194. Oullette, supra note 193, at 14.
195. Id. at 15 (citing Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F. Supp. 2d 184, 187 (N.D.N.Y. 2002)). To
"palliate" is to "reduce the violence of a disease" or "ease without curing." Medline Plus Online
Medical Dictionary, http://www2.merriam-webster.com/cgi-
bin/mwmednlm?book=Medical&va=palliation (last visited Nov. 1, 2005). "Hydration" is, in this
context, the introduction of fluid into the body, Medline Plus Online Medical Dictionary
http://www2.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/mwmednlm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005). Palliative
hydration care thus consists of the administration of liquids for the comfort of the patient, not
with an eye toward curing, or even treating, illness.
196. Oullette, supra note 193, at 15-16.
197. Id. at 16 (quoting aff. of Kathleen Graff, M.D., JA. on Appeal at 1647-48, Blouin v.
Spitzer, No. 02-7997 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 2003) (internal citations omitted)).
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capacity to express her wishes regarding the administration or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. 198 State officials felt
constrained to adopt a vitalist position even in that case, in which all
parties agreed that the continued treatment was causing what one
physician termed "grotesque harm" to Ms. Pouliot.
199
Such harm is extreme; more common would be the risks to any
persons existing on medically supplied nutrition and hydration, such as
the risk of aspiration even though food is not traveling through the
mouth and throat, and the risk of infection at the site of tube
insertion. 2 0 Ms. Pouliot's case serves to illustrate, however, that the
provision of medically supplied nutrition and hydration is not an
unadulterated good.20 1 Termed in one law review article as an example
of "vitalism run amuck,' 2°2 the Pouliot case provides a vivid example
of a situation in which even persons who believe all life is worth
preserving should balk at continuing treatment. Surely even members
of the disability rights community who fear discrimination would agree
that subjecting Ms. Pouliot to this treatment in fact diminished and even
harmed her. Yet those familiar with Schiavo recognize such insistence
to continue with treatment at all costs.
20 3
198. That law has since changed. Health Care Decisions Act for Persons With Mental
Retardation, N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1750, 1750-b (McKinney 2003). See also In re Baby
Boy W., 773 N.Y.S.2d 255 (N.Y. Surrogate Ct. 2004) (explaining the history of cases involving
end-of-life decisions that resulted in the adoption of the Health Care Decisions Act); In re AB,
768 N.Y.S.2d 256 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (describing history of Health Care Decisions Act).
199. Ouellette, supra note 193, at 18 (quoting J.A. on Appeal at 960, Blouin v. Spitzer, No.
02-7997 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 2003)).
200. Orentlicher & Callahan, supra note 188, at 397 ("[G]astrostomy tube placement may
increase the risk that the stomach contents will reflux into the esophagus, and some studies have
found that tube feeding increases the risk of aspiration pneumonia"; "[iut also has not reduced the
overall risk of infection.").
201. For example, the data collected in an important study in the late 1990s indicated that
while "artificial feeding was associated with increased survival in coma patients," it was
associated with "decreased survival in patients with acute kidney failure, multiple organ system
failure, cirrhosis of the liver, of chronic obstructive pulmonary (or lung) disease." Id. (citing
Marie L. Borum et al., The Effect of Nutritional Supplementation on Survival in Seriously Ill
Hospitalized Adults: An Evaluation of the SUPPORT Data, 48 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y S33
(2000)).
202. Ouellette, supra note 193, at 21.
203. Ms. Schiavo differed from Ms. Pouliot because Ms. Pouliot could experience pain while
Ms. Schiavo could not, due to her existence in a PVS. Yet some similarities lie in what Jay
Wolfson, the last guardian ad litem appointed for Ms. Schiavo, termed "[nlearly gruesome
examples" of Ms. Schiavo's family's "disturbing belief that they would keep Theresa alive at any
and all costs ... agreement by family members that in the event Theresa should contract diabetes
and subsequent gangrene in each of her limbs, they would agree to amputate each limb, and
would then, were she to be diagnosed with heart disease, perform heart surgery." WOLFSON
REPORT, supra note 134, at 14.
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Moreover, even when doing good, the administration through
medical means of artificial nutrition and hydration constitutes a bodily
invasion that every person, with a disability or not, has the right to
refuse. The United States Supreme Court itself recognized a right not to
endure such bodily intrusion in Cruzan.204  Both tort law and
constitutional law long have honored a competent person's ability to
refuse unwanted touching.20 5 This is the absolute minimum of the right
to refuse treatment, requiring no appreciation of constitutional
dimensions. 20 6  The provision of artificial sustenance and hydration
through a tube inserted into the stomach constitutes a physical
touching. 207  A person may not wish to be poked, prodded, and
continually handled, as one must be when subsisting on medically
supplied nutrition. 2 8 If that person has no current ability to remind us
of the way he or she once felt on that subject, then the testimony of that
person's surrogate decision-maker, coupled with any other relevant
evidence, may similarly convince a fact-finder that the intrusion is
unwanted.20 9 In either case, when an intrusion is unwanted, the person
should not have to suffer that intrusion. Even persons with
disabilities may wish to prevent unwanted bodily intrusions such as the
insertion and continuing presence of tubes in their stomachs.
211
2. The Pairing Facilitated by These Misconceptions Could Actually
Work to the Detriment of People With Disabilities
Disability rights groups that have joined with vitalist activists, as well
as those individual people with disabilities who support the joinder, in
fact seek to deprive people with disabilities of rights when they seek to
diminish the ability to withdraw or withhold medical treatment. A
vitalist position is not necessary to protect the interests of people with
204. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) ("The principle that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.").
205. Id. at 269-70.
206. See THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 11, § 2.06[A], at 2-23 (recounting history of
common-law source of right to refuse treatment).
207. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 288-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
208. See infra note 233 (discussing a North Carolina poll relating to end-of-life issues); infra
note 235 (discussing statistics regarding physician-assisted death in Oregon). See also In re
Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 424 (N.J. 1987) (reiterating its recognition in Quinlan that "most people
would consider an artificially-prolonged vegetative existence 'unendurable[]"').
209. See, e.g., In re Peter, 529 A.2d at 426-27 (reviewing the types of evidence a court may
find helpful).
210. Id. at 423 ("Medical choices are private, regardless of whether a patient is able to make
them personally or must rely on a surrogate.").
211. E.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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disabilities because the law already incorporates safeguards to prevent
inappropriate withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.212
Those people with disabilities who wish to have the same rights of self-
determination as people without disabilities with respect to the
administration or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment should
recognize that the pairing of the disability rights community with
vitalist activists is detrimental to their interests.
In fact, the law already incorporates several features that protect
people with disabilities, as well as any other person whose end-of-life
decisions medical professionals and loved ones debate. First, as Lois
Shepherd has noted, surrogate decision-makers who choose
continuation of treatment rarely face challenge.2 13 Other than in the
relatively rare and extreme situations in which physicians or other
caregivers argue that treatment should be discontinued as futile,2 14
treatment will continue when surrogate decision-makers state that the
patient would have wished continuation.
Second, regardless of the condition of the patient or the type of
treatment at issue, the "clearly dominant" standard of proof for end-of-
life decision-making cases is the clear and convincing standard of proof
applicable when a surrogate decision-maker seeks authorization to
withhold or withdraw treatment. 215 "Clear and convincing evidence,"
while not necessarily uncontroverted,216 has been described as
produc[ing] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction
as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so
clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the factfinder]
to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the
precise facts at issue. 217
This constitutes a presumption, requiring a surrogate decision-maker
favoring withholding or withdrawal of treatment to prove more clearly
than in a regular civil lawsuit either (1) that the patient actually had
stated that he or she wished withholding or withdrawal in the
211circumstances at hand, (2) that the patient would have wished
212. See infra notes 213-226 and accompanying text (discussing the three features of the law
regarding the administration or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment).
213. Shepherd, supra note 6, at 42.
214. See THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 11, at § 13 (examining the issues and problems of
"futile" medical treatment).
215. Id. at § 3.27[A], at 3-126.
216. Id.
217. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 441 (N.J. 1987).
218. That would be evidence satisfying the subjective standard. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra
note 11, at § 4.05, at 4-28 to 4-33. In Cruzan, the Missouri Supreme Court searched for clear and
convincing evidence of Nancy's subjective, actually expressed wishes. Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't
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withholding or withdrawal in the circumstances at hand, based on
evidence including that patient's statements values, beliefs and
attitudes, 2 19 or (3) in certain limited circumstances, that withholding or
withdrawal would be in the patient's best interests. 2 2  In certain cases,
courts have been even more cautious, requiring evidence of actual
statements that withholding or withdrawal was desired rather than
evidence of values, beliefs and attitudes, even though their states' laws
otherwise would have permitted withholding or withdrawal on the basis
of the latter sort of evidence.
221
Finally, of course, although not applying to most end-of-life
treatment situations, it must be remembered that laws specifically
prohibiting disability discrimination exist to protect the interests of
those people with disabilities. 222 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973223 prohibits discrimination by hospitals participating in the
Medicare and Medicaid programs against "otherwise qualified,"
"handicapped" individuals.224  Section 302 of the Americans With
of Health, 497 U.S. 261,316 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
219. That would be evidence satisfying the substituted judgment standard. THE RIGHT TO
DIE, supra note 11, at §§ 4.02, 4.03, at 4-11-4-25. E.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664-666
(N.J. 1976) (discussing the substituted judgment standard).
220. That would be evidence satisfying the best interests standard, which is usually a burden-
benefit analysis. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 11, at § 4.07, at 4-41-4-79. The best interests
test generally only will be applied under two circumstances: (1) when the patient was never
competent to make medical decisions (such as a child or a mentally retarded person), or (2) when
no evidence is available to demonstrate either the patient's actual or the patient's inferred wishes.
See, e.g., Woods v. Ky. Cabinet of Human Resources, 142 S.W.3d 24, 34-35 (Ky. 2004)
(describing the best interests test and its application); In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 67-68 n.8
(Wis. 1992) (detailing the infrequency with which written instructions are available).
221. See In re Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001) (requiring clear and convincing evidence,
in the form of actual statements, when the individual is conscious but severely physically and
mentally impaired); In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995) (refusing to authorize the
removal of life support without clear and convincing evidence of the conscious incapacitated
individual's pre-injury statement expressing his decision to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment under the present circumstances); In re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1997)
(refusing to allow a guardian to withdraw life support when there were no actual statements from
patient of her desires).
222. See THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 11, at §§ I 1.09[B], [C], at 11-68-11-71 (discussing
the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (2000), and § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000)). Claims based on these laws were raised and
ruled unlikely to succeed in Schiavo. Schindler v. Schiavo, No. 8:05-CV-530-T-27-BM (M.D.
Fla. Mar. 22, 2005), aff'd No. 05-11556 (11th Cir. Mar. 23, 2005) (en banc), available at
University of Miami Ethics Program, http://www.miami.edulethics/schiavo/timeline.htm (follow
March 22, 2005 "Federal Court Order" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
223. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
224. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1027 (E.D. Va. 1993), affid, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.
1994).
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Disabilities Act (ADA) 225  prohibits all public accommodations
(including hospitals and other health care providers) from
discriminating against disabled individuals, without regard to whether
those individuals are otherwise qualified to receive the services at
issue.
2 26
In addition to recognizing these protections already built into the law,
one must also remember that evidence does not exist to support fears of
discrimination against people with disabilities in end-of-life decision-
making. 227  It is difficult to find empirical research addressing these
matters, but empirical research about Oregon's law permitting physician
assistance in ending lives may serve as an imperfect analogy for present
purposes. 22 8  Despite fears articulated at the time of its passage,
Oregon's law in fact has not resulted in discrimination against and has
not been overly utilized by vulnerable persons.
229
It is paternalistic to believe that no person with a disability wishes to
refuse life-sustaining treatment. Persons with disabilities should no
more be subjected to unwanted medical treatment than non-disabled
persons are.2 30 Yet the pairing of disability rights and vitalist activists
during and since Schiavo has resulted in the introduction of bills in
federal and state legislatures that would infringe upon (or, at a
minimum, severely burden) the rights of both people with and without
disabilities in the name of protecting the vulnerable.
231
225. 42 U.S.C. §12,182(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
226. Id. See also Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1028 (describing congressional legislative intent).
227. Cf Norman L. Cantor, On Kamisar, Killing and Physician-Assisted Death, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 1793, 1813 (2004) (noting that refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment "poses hazards,"
but that "despite thousands of deaths per day associated with medical management of the dying
process, medical services for dying patients have been remarkably free of widespread abuse in the
sense of premature terminations of human lives").
228. Oregon's law has endured several legal and political challenges since its inception. See,
e.g., Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995) (enjoining implementation), vacated and
remanded, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding a lack of federal jurisdiction), cert. denied sub
nom. Lee v. Harcleroad, 522 U.S. 927 (1997) (denying the petition for certiorari). The most
recent challenge came from the federal government, when the United States Department of
Justice notified physicians and pharmacists that it would revoke the Drug Enforcement
Administration registrations of those writing or filling prescriptions in accordance with the
Oregon law. (DEA registration is necessary to prescribe and fill prescriptions for federally
controlled substances.) See generally Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2002);
affd, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), aft'd, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006) (challenging the federal
revocation of registration).
229. See DEATH WITH DIGNITY ANNUAL REPORTS, http://egov.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/ar-
index.shtm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005) (listing statistics on persons requesting and using lethal
prescriptions pursuant to Oregon's Death With Dignity Act since its inception).
230. Cf Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the state's
interest in preserving life did not outweigh patient's right to refuse treatment).
23 1. As of August 2005, research revealed at least 30 such legislative proposals.
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A key feature of such bills is often an attempt to require a written
advance directive to authorize withholding or withdrawal of medically
supplied nutrition and hydration from a patient in a PVS or who is
otherwise incapable of making medical decisions. 232 This is proposed
although most people say they wish to have medically supplied nutrition
and hydration withheld or withdrawn when they enter a PVS or
otherwise reach a point at which they believe continued medical
intervention is inappropriate. 233  The proposed bills would require the
continuation of treatment for that majority of people, however, because
most people, for whatever reason, do not write their wishes down. 234
While it would be interesting to see some studies indicating whether
Incapacitated Persons Legal Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1151, 109th Cong. (2005); Alabama
Starvation and Dehydration of Persons With Disabilities Prevention Act, H.B. 592, 2005 Reg.
Sess. (Ala. 2005); Florida Starvation and Dehydration of Persons With Disabilities Prevention
Act, H.B. 701 & S.B. 2128, 107th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005); H.B. 1345 & S.B. 2308, 107th Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 2005); Hawaii Starvation and Dehydration of Persons With Disabilities Prevention
Act, H. B. 1332, 1577 & S.B. 1809, 23d State Leg. (Haw. 2005); Iowa Starvation and
Dehydration of Persons With Disabilities Prevention Act, H. Study B. 302, 81 st Gen. Assem., 1st
Sess. (Iowa 2005); H.B. 2287, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2005); H.B. 501, 2005 Reg. Sess. (Ky.
2005); Human Dignity Act, S.B. 40, 31st Reg. Sess. (La. 2005); H.B. 4743, 93d Leg. Reg. Sess.
(Mich. 2005); Presumption of Nutrition and Hydration Sufficient to Sustain Life Act, S. File
2008, H. File 2369, & 2450; H.B. 905, 93d Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005); An Act
Authorizing the Use of a Declaration, Also Known as a Living Will, To Require the Provision of
Life-Sustaining Treatment as well as the Withholding or Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining
Treatment, H.B. 526, 59th Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2005); Assem. B. 7009, 7912 & S.B. 4083, 228th
Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); North Carolina Disabled Persons Protection Act, H.B. 1175, Gen.
Assem., Sess. 2005 (N.C. 2005); H.B. 201, 216 & S.B. 130, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio
2005); H.B. 1567 & H.B. 2054, 50th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2005); South Carolina Starvation and
Dehydration of Persons With Disabilities Prevention Act, H.B. 4013, Gen. Assem., 116th Sess.
(S.C. 2005). One bill, in Louisiana, was passed and signed into law. Human Dignity Act, H.B.
675, 31st Reg. Sess., 2005 La. Acts 447.
232. E.g., Florida Starvation and Dehydration of Persons With Disabilities Prevention Act,
H.B. 701, 107th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005) (listing presence of a specific written advance directive as
one of three limited ways incompetent patients would have medically supplied nutrition and
hydration withdrawn). Cf. H.B. 201, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (giving priority
among possible surrogate decision-makers to individuals agreeing not to withhold life-sustaining
treatment); H.B. 216, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (erecting barriers to
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment when a person has not designated a
surrogate decision-maker). See generally Michael Allen, The Constitution at the Threshold of
Life and Death: A Suggested Approach to Accommodate an Interest in Life and a Right to Die, 53
AM. U. L. REV. 971, 1014 (2004) (describing a hypothetical state's requirement of a written
advance directive and concluding that such a law would not impose an undue burden on those
wishing to exercise a constitutional right to refuse treatment).
233. See AARP, NORTH CAROLINA END OF LIFE CARE SURVEY (2003), available at
http:/www.aarp.org/research/reference/memberopinions/Artices/aresearch-import-68.html
(noting that seventy-nine percent of AARP members surveyed believe that it is important to be
off machines that extend life).
234. See Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, 34
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30, 32 (March-April 2004) ("People widely say they want a living will..
. Despite this, and despite decades of urging, most Americans lack them.").
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persons with disabilities differ from most Americans in these
respects, 2 35 this Essay proceeds upon the assumption that, except
perhaps to the extent that someone causes them to fear exploitation of a
vulnerability, persons with disabilities do not differ greatly frompeople
without disabilities with regard to end-of-life treatment wishes. 2 3-6 It is
most likely that, as with so many issues, "like any politically, ethnically,
and religiously diverse community ... the community of people with
disabilities is far from unanimous" on this issue.237  For example, at
least one important aspect of the disability rights movement, the
independent living movement, has been rooted in a desire to "empower
people with disabilities to control their lives and to live independently in
their communities. ' 238  Just as one foundation of the right to refuse
treatment was the right to control one's own body, the foundation of the
"independent living movement" was the right of persons with
disabilities "to make.., independent choices about where and how [to]
live." 239  Persons who believe deeply in the right to independence in
235. The views of some persons with disabilities on a related, but distinct, issue may be
instructive. At the time of passage of the Oregon law permitting physician-assisted suicide (in
1994), studies tended to show that the views of people with disabilities did not vary greatly from
those of the general population. See, e.g., Andrew I. Batavia, Disability and Physician Assisted
Suicide, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1671, 1671 (1995) (describing a Harris poll conducted in 1994
that found that 66 percent of people with disabilities who were surveyed supported a right to
assisted suicide, as compared with 70 percent of the general population).
236. This is not meant to diminish either the results of studies that indicate that people
attempting to engage in advance medical decision-making often mis-predict what they actually
will want or to refuse in terms of treatment once they are suffering from the condition they had
been anticipating, or the statistics indicating that people are inaccurate in predicting their quality
of life should they develop a disability. Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 234, at 34. Cf.
Elizabeth A. Pendo, Substantially Limited Justice?: The Possibilities and Limits of a New
Rawlsian Analysis of Disability-Based Discrimination, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 225, 269-71
(2003) (noting people's inability to accurately predict future perceptions regarding quality of life).
See also Diane Coleman, Not Dead Yet, in THE CASE AGAINST ASSISTED SUICIDE: FOR THE
RIGHT TO END-OF-LIFE CARE 225 (Kathleen Foley & Herbert Hendin eds., 2002) (citing studies
that "show that medical professionals assess the quality of life of disabled people to be
dramatically lower than disabled people themselves do"); Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch,
Disability Beyond Stigma: Social Interaction, Discrimination, and Activism 44 J. SOCIAL ISSUES
3, 8-15 (describing a range of discriminatory assumptions made about people with disabilities);
Fitzgerald, supra note 146, at 271 (noting that "[t]he cultural stereotype of the 'life not worth
living' is a very powerful one in relation to people with disability"). It merely is to say that there
is no evidence that people with disabilities wish to have less right to refuse treatment than those
without disabilities.
237. Batavia, supra note 235, at 1671.
238. Andrew I. Batavia, The New Paternalism (Evaluating the Idea of Disabled Persons as
Oppressed Minority), 12 J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. 107, 107 (2001) (considering "the negative
implications of a disability rights strategy based in part on the characterization of people with
disabilities as an oppressed minority" and concluding that "this approach is inconsistent with the
antipatemalistic philosophical roots of the disability rights/independent living movement").
239. Andrew I. Batavia, Disability Rights in the Third Stage of the Independent Living
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
choices in how to live will support other rights, such as the right to
refuse treatment, based on autonomy and self-determination.
240
Indeed, "[t]he contention that all people with disabilities are so
oppressed, simply by virtue of their disability status, as to be presumed
incapable of making end-of-life decisions reflects the same paternalism
that the independent living movement was established to abolish."
24 1
Given that assumption, the problem with such bills is that, rather than
protecting people with disabilities and other vulnerable persons from
abuse, they actually make it more difficult for both people with and
without disabilities to exercise important rights to avoid unwanted
bodily intrusion and exercise self-determination.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, one lesson to be learned from tracing the development of the
law and politics from Quinlan to Cruzan to Schiavo is that people with
disabilities like Kristen should be drawn into reasoned conversation to a
greater extent. Rather than indulging what one commentator has termed
"reflexive scorn" for the people demonstrating against the withdrawal of
Ms. Schiavo's PEG tube,24 those who believe in self-determination
should listen more carefully to the fears motivating some of the persons
with disabilities participating in such demonstrations. Interest among
the disability rights community in end-of-life decision-making matters
is not new, but it has been powered, most recently in Schiavo, by
imagery and an unfortunate alliance of disability rights and vitalist
activists. The result actually diminishes and devalues persons with
disabilities, by attempting to protect them rather than permitting them to
make their own decisions. In contrast, decisions like Schiavo, far from
endangering persons with disabilities, serve all persons who value
control over their own bodies, including persons with disabilities.
Movement: Disability Community Consensus, Dissention, and the Future of Disability Policy, 14
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 347, 347 (2003) (published in draft form after Mr. Batavia's death).
240. Cf Batavia, supra note 239, at 350 (describing the reasons some persons with disabilities
support the right to physician-assisted suicide).
241. Andrew I. Batavia, Disability and Physician-Assisted Dying, in PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
DYING: THE CASE FOR PALLIATIVE CARE AND PATIENT CHOICE 67 (Timothy E. Quill &
Margaret P. Battin eds., 2004).
242. Schneider, supra note 24, at 24, 25.
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